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NOT SO "FIRMLY ROOTED": EXCEPTIONS TO
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
STANLEY A. GOLDMAN t
Hearsay statements admitted under a 'firmly rooted" exception
may have no inherent guarantees of reliability. Professor Goldman
traces the history of the 'firmly rooted" doctrine, discusses its rationale,
and reviews its expansion. He analyzes these exceptions under confron-
tation clause requirements and determines they generally lack the requi-
site reliability. Professor Goldman concludes the 'firmly rooted"
concept is neither useful nor workable, and urges instead that courts
adopt a case-by-case examination of hearsay statements' trust-
worthiness.
I. INTRODUCTION
"Flugum done it." Everyone who heard the dying man's last words knew
they were spoken "in the hush of [death's] impending presence" and with a
settled expectation that death was imminent.' The listeners also knew that
Flugum and the deceased had been bitter rivals for years. At the murder trial,
Flugum testified in his own defense that at the time of the fatal shooting he had
been home asleep. He could produce no witnesses to support his alibi, nor could
any prosecution witness place him at the scene of the murder. Given the death-
bed declaration, however, the jury felt confident in its guilty verdict. After all,
why would the dead man have voluntarily chosen to go to his Maker with a lie
on his lips? In fact, this assumption by the jury that the dying declaration is
reliable is the reason why courts admit such hearsay.
2
What the jury never learned was whether the deceased was an atheist who
feared no retribution in an afterlife or whether he had long harbored a secret
design for revenge against the man he had named in his last moments. If the
declarant had lived, the jury could have heard the accusation from his own lips.
He may have proved a credible witness, or he may have projected a demeanor
t Professor of Law, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. B.A. 1972, University of California at
Los Angeles; J.D. 1975, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles. The author gratefully acknowledges the
support of his colleagues, Associate Dean Jan C. Costello and Professors Victor J. Gold, Daniel P.
Selmi and Michael E. Wolfson, with the knowledge that, in the words of H.G. Wells, -[no] passion
on earth, neither love nor hate, is equal to the passion to alter someone else's draft." The author also
thanks Lisa K. Rozzano and Daniel D. McMillan, Loyola Law School, 1987, for their assistance in
the preparation of this Article.
1. Shepard v. United States, 290 U.S. 96, 100 (1933) (Cardozo, J.). The introductory illustra-
tion was suggested in part by some of the facts of Commonwealth v. Fugman, 198 A. 99 (1938).
2. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 281 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE 804(b)(2)[01] (1985); 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1430-1452,
(Chadbourn rev. 1974). See generally Jaffee, The Constitution and Proof by Dead or Unconfrontable
Declarants, 33 ARK. L. REV. 227 (1979) (stating possible historical origin of the dying declaration
exception).
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that combined the more distasteful characteristics of a snake-oil salesman and a
pimp. But no matter how poor the declarant's demeanor may have been, it was
safely hidden from the trier of fact.
Indeed, whenever a court admits hearsay testimony, the possibility exists
that the jury may never be able to accurately judge the reliability of the out-of-
court accusation. Of course, when hearsay is used against criminal defendants,
they are always at liberty to attempt to persuade the trier of fact that the out-of-
court statement was never made, or that, even if made, the declarant should not
be believed. Still a risk always exists that by permitting the use of a declarant's
hearsay statements, his true motives, beliefs, and perceptions may not emerge as
they might have had the declarant been in court and subject to cross-
examination. 3
These increased risks inherent in the inability to cross-examine the declar-
ant under oath and in the presence of the trier of fact account for the general
rule excluding out-of-court assertions when offered to prove their truth.4 Yet,
some hearsay statements are said to be spoken in circumstances of such inherent
trustworthiness that courts and legislatures have created exceptions allowing
their admission even though the opponent has never been provided an opportu-
nity to question the declarant.5 When these exceptions are invoked against a
criminal defendant, the Supreme Court has concluded that the constitutional
rights to confrontation of witnesses and due process of law may sometimes be
violated. 6
The United States Supreme Court has concluded that the confrontation
clause demands that hearsay from a declarant who has not been confronted
must possess adequate "indicia of reliability" before it may be used against a
criminal defendant. 7 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court failed to describe the
quantum of trustworthiness necessary to satisfy the confrontation clause in other
than general terms. Exactly how much reliability is enough remains uncertain.
The Supreme Court, however, has given hints. The Court has stated that
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to satisfy confrontation can be "inferred" if the
hearsay statement falls within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception."8 Thus, hear-
say falling within such an exception presumptively possesses sufficient indicia of
3. "[O]ne critical goal of cross-examination is to draw out discrediting demeanor to be viewed
by the factfinder." Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 n.6 (1980) (citing Government of Virgin Islands
v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3d Cir. 1967)).
4. See, e.g., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 245.
5. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 245 (discussing admissible hear-
say); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 800[01] (discussing admissible hearsay); 5 J.
WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1362 (discussing admissible hearsay).
6. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the
witnesses against him .... U.S. CONST. amend. VI. No state may "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law ...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See infra note 7
and accompanying text.
7. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972); Dutton v. Evans,
400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion). For purposes of this Article, the terms "reliability"
and "trustworthiness" will be used interchangeably.
8. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
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reliability to be constitutionally admissible. 9 However, the Court has yet to
clearly set forth the specific requirements to be met before an exception can be
classified as "firmly rooted."
The thesis of this Article is that a hearsay exception should not be consid-
ered firmly rooted merely because it is widely recognized or of ancient origin.
Such criteria are not necessarily linked with the basic constitutional requirement
of reliability. Rather, the test for determining which exceptions qualify as firmly
rooted must critically examine the degree of reliability guaranteed by the excep-
tion's requirements.
This Article first seeks to determine what must be required of an exception
before it can be labeled "firmly rooted." That test is constructed from various
standards the Supreme Court has articulated as necessary for compliance with
the confrontation clause. The combination of these standards leads to the
conclusion that exceptions to the hearsay rule should be classified as firmly
rooted only if (1) the exception guarantees the accused a meaningful opportunity
to question the declarant or (2) the circumstances prerequisite to admission
under that exception realistically assure a substantial likelihood that "virtually
any" statement offered under it is based upon personal knowledge and is not the
product of either faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional
misrepresentation.
The Article examines the exceptions that the Supreme Court has described
as firmly rooted, as well as those additional exceptions which lower courts have
added to the ranks of the firmly rooted, to determine whether the classification
is justified in light of the Supreme Court's own standards. The Article evaluates
the validity of dividing exceptions into categories of "firmly" and non-"firmly
rooted," and concludes that the concept is neither workable nor useful and
should be abandoned. Finally, the Article suggests that the only method for
realistically reconciling the confrontation clause with the exceptions to the
hearsay rule is a case-by-case examination to determine whether the hearsay
statement was made under circumstances of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.
II. RELIABILITY AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
"[T]he Confrontation Clause comes to us on faded parchment."' 0 With
this single sentence, Justice Harlan captured the enigmatic origins of this provi-
sion of the Bill of Rights. Tradition, if not demonstrable fact, suggests that the
confrontation clause, as well as the common-law hearsay rule, originated in re-
action to the outrageous trial and eventual execution of Sir Walter Raleigh."1
9. Id. at 73.
10. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 173-74 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Although the
Senate debates from the period are unrecorded, it appears that the House of Representatives adopted
the confrontation clause as part of the Bill of Rights without debate. Note, Reconciling the Conflict
Between the Coconspirator Exemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the
Sixth Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1301 n.42 (1985) (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 15-16,
756, 767 (J. Gales ed. 1789)).
11. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 86 n.16 (plurality opinion) ("It has been suggested that the constitu-
1987]
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Raleigh's conviction rested solely on what would now be described as inadmissi-
ble hearsay.' 2 Though modem scholars have tended to minimize the influence
of Raleigh's trial on the drafting of the confrontation clause, few dispute the
basic tenet that the clause, as well as the hearsay rule, were penned to safeguard
criminal defendants against conviction in the absence of an opportunity to con-
front their accusers.1 3 Because the specific parameters of the original clause re-
main obscure, however, both courts and scholars have found considerable
difficulty applying this portion of the sixth amendment.' 4 The application is
particularly complicated when the issue is the relationship between the confron-
tation clause and the non-constitutionally based hearsay rule.
The hearsay rule and the confrontation clause are similar in that both ex-
clude from evidence certain out-of-court assertions.' 5 However, the two are not
tional provision is based on a common-law principle that had its origin in a reaction to abuses at the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh.") (citing F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT 104 (1951)). For a
contrary view, see Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh
Loses Another One, 8 Crim. L. Bull. 99, 100 n.4 (1972). According to Graham,
[n]o one seems to have been able to write about the right without repeating the claim that
the evils of the Raleigh trial led in some way to the Sixth Amendment. My research gives
me no reason to suppose that this custom represents anything other than a convenient but
highly romantic myth, and I adhere to it for this reason.
Id. (citations omitted).
12. For a more complete account of the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, see Green, 399 U.S. at 157
n.10; Graham, supra note 11, at 99-101 (Professor Graham gathered his account from 2 T.
HOWELL, STATE TRIALS 25 (1809) and 1 D. JARDINE, CRIMINAL TRIALS 389-511 (1832)); Pollitt,
The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381, 388-89 (1959); H.
Stephens, The Trial ofSir Walter Raleigh, TRANS. ROYAL HIST. Soc'Y 172 (4th ser. 1919).
13. The Supreme Court has written:
[Certainly no one experienced in the trial of lawsuits, would deny the value of cross-
examination in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth in the trial of a criminal case.
The fact that this right appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the
belief of the Framers of those liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamen-
tal right essential to a fair trial in a criminal prosecution.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (citations omitted). The confrontation clause is acknowl-
edged as having been created to prevent what has been described as the "inquisitional practice of
examining witnesses in closed chambers." Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v.
Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV. 207, 211-12 (1984). "Historically, the inclusion of the Confrontation
Clause in the Bill of Rights reflected the Framers' conviction that the defendant must not be denied
the opportunity to challenge his accusers in a direct encounter before the trier of fact." Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 78 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 156-58; Park v.
Huff, 506 F.2d 849, 861-62 (5th Cir. 1975) (Gewin, J., concurring)).
In an earlier decision, the Supreme Court noted:
The primary object of the constitutional provision in question was to prevent deposi-
tions or ex parte affidavits, such as were sometimes admitted in civil cases, being used
against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness
in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order
that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in
which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895); see also Roberts, 448 U.S. at 356 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the right of confrontation and cross-examination).
14. "The complexity of reconciling the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules has trig-
gered an outpouring of scholarly commentary." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.9. For a listing of the
scholarly writings on the subject, see id. For a general discussion of the confrontation clause, see
Green, 399 U.S. at 153-64.
15. The "hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar
values," Green, 399 U.S. at 155, and may be said to "stem from the same roots," Dutton, 400 U.S. at
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coextensive and do not always exclude the same assertions.' 6 The hearsay rule
was not intended as a means of implementing a line of demarcation between the
constitutional and unconstitutional use of out-of-court statements. The hearsay
rule may require greater trustworthiness as a prerequisite to admission than does
the confrontation clause.17 The contrary, however, cannot be true: exceptions
cannot permit the admission of hearsay that is less trustworthy than the mini-
mum necessary to satisfy the confrontation requirements. This latter fact is im-
portant because not every statement admissible under all judicially or statutorily
created hearsay exceptions will necessarily comply with the requirements of
confrontation. 18
Beginning with the plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans, 19 the United
States Supreme Court has clearly stated that reliability is the linchpin between
the exceptions to the hearsay rule and the confrontation clause.20 Dicta in the
86; see Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. "[H]istorical evidence leaves little doubt ... that the [Confrontation]
Clause was intended to exclude some hearsay." Id. at 63 (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 156-57 & nn.9-
10); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 252 ("constitutional problems of
hearsay").
16. United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 844 (1973); see
also Dutton, 400 U.S. at 81-82 (Stewart, J.) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 155-56 and discussing differ-
ences between confrontation clause and hearsay rule); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346,
1356-57 (8th Cir. 1976) (discussing differences between confrontation clause and hearsay rule), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
17. In Green, 399 U.S. at 170, the Supreme Court permitted the prosecution to use a witness'
prior inconsistent statement which was made neither under oath nor subject to prior cross-examina-
tion. In spite of this use, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(A) requires that only those prior
inconsistent statements previously made under oath are admissible. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A).
Thus, the exception requires more than does the confrontation clause.
18. "It is clear that the mere existence of a hearsay exception does not cause the confrontation
clause to recede. Thus, confrontation values have been found violated even when evidence was ad-
mitted under arguably recognized hearsay exceptions." United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 965
n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citing Green, 399 U.S. at 156; Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v.
Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).
Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit has recognized the
problem:
Whatever the law on this point may have once been, there can no longer be any doubt that,
despite the fact that an extra-judicial statement may satisfy the requirements of a recog-
nized exception to the hearsay rule, the introduction of such a statement may in certain
circumstances be barred because that introduction, if accomplished, would violate the de-
fendant's right to confrontation.
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80-81 (2d Cir. 1977).
Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986), is an example of the United States Supreme Court's
reversal of a conviction because the trial court's admission of hearsay violated the defendant's right
to confrontation. For a discussion of Lee, see infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text.
19. 400 U.S. 74 (1970). Having returned to his cell after arraignment on charges of murder,
Evans' co-defendant Williams was asked by a cellmate how the day had gone in court. Williams
allegedly responded, "If it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch, Alex Evans, we would not be in
this [situation] now." Id. at 77. Although this evidence would have normally been inadmissible
hearsay in most jurisdictions, Georgia law provided an expansive reading of the coconspirator excep-
tion that allowed the admission of this statement against Evans. Georgia's evidence code provided:
"[A]fter the fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators
during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all." GA. CODE ANN. § 38-
306 (1974). Evans claimed that the use of Williams' out-of-court assertion against him denied Evans
the right of confrontation of witnesses. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 83. A fragmented Court concluded in a
plurality opinion that the confrontation clause was not violated by the use of the statements against
defendant Evans. Id. at 88.
20. The plurality in Dutton concluded that "the mission of the Confrontation Clause is to ad-
vance a practical concern for the accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by
1987]
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subsequent case of Ohio v. Roberts 21 reaffirmed that when a hearsay statement is
made under circumstances of sufficient "indicia of reliability," the prosecution
could use it without violating the confrontation clause.2 2 The Court in Roberts
further noted that sufficient reliability 23 to satisfy the demands of the confronta-
tion clause "can be inferred without more in a case where the evidence falls
within afirmly rooted hearsay exception." '24
assuring that 'the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior state-
ment.'' Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89 (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161).
Another decision also reasoned from this language in Green:
The function of the cross-examination requirement is to assure that "the trier of fact
has a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement" introduced into
evidence at trial, whether by transcript of a prior hearing or by hearsay testimony. How-
ever, some statements are, because of their content or the circumstances in which they were
uttered, obviously reliable even in the absence of cross-examination of the declarant.
United States v. Puco, 476 F.2d 1099, 1103 (2d Cir.) (quoting Green, 399 U.S. at 161), cert. deified,
414 U.S. 844 (1973).
21. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). In Roberts the accused "was charged with possession of stolen checks
and credit cards belonging to Bernard Isaacs and [forging a] check in [Isaacs'] name." Id. at 58.
Isaacs' daughter, Anita, was called by the defense to testify at the preliminary hearing. Anita, a
friend of defendant's, testified that she had permitted Roberts to use her apartment while she was
away, but had not authorized the use of her father's checks and credit cards. Id. at 60.
At trial, Roberts testified that Anita had given him the checks and credit cards with the under-
standing that he was permitted to use them; in rebuttal, the prosecution offered Anita's testimony
from the preliminary hearing. Id. at 59. To demonstrate her unavailability, the prosecution pointed
to the fact that Anita had failed to answer five subpoenas sent to her parents' home; further, her
mother testified that Anita had left home a year prior to trial and had not contacted her parents for
seven months, and that they had no way to reach her, even in an emergency. Id. at 60. The trial
judge admitted the preliminary hearing transcript and Roberts was convicted. Id.
22. Id. at 73; see also Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972) (former testimony bore
sufficient "indicia of reliability" to comply with the requirements of the confrontation clause because
defense counsel had previously availed himself of the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the
prior trial); Green, 399 U.S. at 165-66 (" 'there may be some justification for holding that the oppor-
tunity for cross-examination of a witness at a preliminary hearing satisfies the demands of the con-
frontation clause where the witness is shown to be actually unavailable .......") (quoting Barber v.
Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725-26 (1968)). Dicta in Roberts suggested a two-pronged test for determining
when the prosecution's use of a hearsay statement does not violate a defendant's right to confronta-
tion. First, the government must demonstrate the declarant's unavailability; second, the out-of-
court assertion must possess certain "indicia of reliability." Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
The first requirement has since been substantially limited by the Court in United States v. Inadi,
106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986), which maintains that Roberts' constitutionally mandated unavailability,
although a prerequisite to the constitutional use of prior testimony, is not necessarily required for all
other hearsay exceptions. For the facts surrounding the witness' unavailability in Roberts, see supra
note 21. Specifically, Inadi found unavailability was not a prerequisite for prosecutorial use of hear-
say statements of a coconspirator. Id. at 1126-27. The necessity of unavailability is an intricate
subject in itself, the worthy topic of an entire article, and will not be analyzed in this Article.
23. The discussion in Roberts implied there are two alternative methods of establishing suffi-
cient reliability by which hearsay can satisfy the confrontation clause. First, defendant must have
been provided an opportunity to question the hearsay declarant about the substance of the out-of-
court statement. The opportunity to question is, of course, the method by which a witness' credibil-
ity is traditionally tested. See 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1367, at 32 (cross-examination is
"beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."). A constitu-
tionally sufficient opportunity to question a hearsay declarant may apparently occur either at the
time the out-of-court statement was made, as in the case of previously cross-examined former testi-
mony, or at the time of the trial itself, as in the case of those exceptions which allow for the substan-
tive use of prior inconsistent statements, FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A), past recollections recorded, id.
803(5), or prior identifications, id. 801(d)(1)(C). As a second alternative if defendant has not been
provided an opportunity to question the hearsay declarant, the out-of-court statement can still be
admitted so long as it was made under sufficiently trustworthy circumstances.
24. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (emphasis added).
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The Court failed to define "firmly rooted." Rather, with respect to which
exceptions could be so classified, the Court simply stated that "certain hearsay
exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evi-
dence within them comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protec-
tion.' "25 Only those exceptions satisfying this general standard can properly be
labeled firmly rooted. If the hearsay does not fall within a firmly rooted excep-
tion, it may still be constitutionally admissible, so long as the prosecution can
establish the statement was made under circumstances with "particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness." '2 6
Thus, the use of a declarant's out-of-court assertion against a criminal de-
fendant is "presumptively" constitutional or unconstitutional depending on
whether the statement is offered under a firmly rooted exception. Because the
Court has created a type of presumption, 27 it is important initially to determine
whether that presumption can be rebutted. Most courts faced with this issue
have concluded correctly that Roberts created two rebuttable presumptions. The
first presumption is one of constitutional inadmissibility when the out-of-court
assertion does not fall within a firmly rooted exception. This presumption is
rebutted when the prosecution is able to establish that the hearsay was spoken
under circumstances with "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. ' 2 8
The second presumption is one in favor of constitutional admissibility when
the hearsay falls within a firmly rooted exception. 29 This presumption may be
25. Id. (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)) (emphasis added). For a
general discussion of the history of the hearsay rule, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
§ 244; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1364.
26. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. In a recent decision, the Supreme Court noted:
In Roberts, we recognize that even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible
for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet the Confrontation Clause reli-
ability standards if it is supported by a "showing of particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness." ... [T]he Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness
that "there is no material departure from the reason of the general rule."
Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2063-64 (1986) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65).
27. Although this approach does not technically create a presumption, as that term is typically
used in the law of evidence, the Court has nonetheless created a presumption in the general sense of
the term. Thus, this Article will use the term "presumption" when analyzing the consequences that
flow from the identification of a hearsay statement as falling within a firmly or nonfirmly rooted
exception. No other standard having been suggested by the Court, it must be assumed that the
burden intended was that of proof beyond a preponderance of the evidence. For a typical statutory
definition of a presumption, see CAL. EvID. CODE § 600 (West 1966), in which the term is defined as
"an assumption of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group of facts found or
otherwise established in the action." For a general discussion of presumptions, see MCCORMICK ON
EVIDENCE, supra note 2, §§ 342-49.
28. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. The rebuttable nature of this presumption was recently reaf-
firmed by the Supreme Court in Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2063-64.
29. The exceptions lower courts have classified as firmly rooted, yet still have found it necessary
to examine the trustworthiness of the particular statement at issue, include adoptive admissions,
FED. R. EV[D. 801(d)(2)(B), former testimony, id. 804 (b)(1), declarations against interest, id.
804(b)(3), spontaneous exclamations, id. 803(2), and present sense impressions, id. 803(1).
For example, in State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 325 N.W.2d 857 (1982), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court noted that although the inference in favor of the reliability of a firmly rooted excep-
tion is strong,
[E]vidence falling within a firmly rooted hearsay exception is not admissible per se. The
trial court must still examine each case to determine whether there are unusual circum-
1987]
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rebutted if defendant can establish that he has not been provided with an ade-
quate opportunity to question the declarant and that the hearsay was spoken
under untrustworthy circumstances. Unfortunately, as a result of the Supreme
Court's lack of clarity with respect to the rebuttable nature of this latter pre-
sumption, some lower courts, without expressly stating that they are doing so,
have seemed to treat the presumptively constitutional status of hearsay offered
under a firmly rooted exception as if it were conclusive.30 Once these courts
determine that a hearsay statement falls within a firmly rooted exception, it ap-
pears no attempt is made to evaluate the trustworthiness of that particular
statement.
31
Although Roberts never explicitly stated this second presumption is rebut-
table, that conclusion extends logically from the Court's underlying call for reli-
ability.32 This can be illustrated by the application of the firmly rooted theory to
stances which may warrant exclusion of the evidence. If no such unusual circumstance
exists, the evidence may be properly admitted. "Where unusual circumstances are appar-
ent, the court may have reason to inquire into whether a meaningful confrontation was
indeed afforded a defendant."
Id. at 213-14, 325 N.W.2d at 862 (quoting Nabbefeld v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 515, 527, 266 N.W.2d 292,
298 (1978)).
Similarly, in State v. Buelow, 122 Wis. 2d 465, 363 N.W.2d 255 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984), the court
noted that "[w]hen the evidence fits within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception, reliability can be in-
ferred and the evidence is generally admissible. While the inference of reliability is strong, the court
must still examine each case to determine whether there are unusual circumstances which warrant
exclusion of the evidence." Id. at 479, 363 N.W.2d at 263 (citing State v. Curbello-Rodriguez, 119
Wis. 2d 414, 430, 351 N.W.2d 758, 766 (Wis. Ct. App. 1984)).
In Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341 (D.N.J. 1982), because the hearsay offered by the prosecu-
tion qualified as a present sense impression, the court concluded that, for confrontation clause pur-
poses, its reliability could be inferred. In spite of this presumption, however, the court examined the
statement itself to determine whether it bore sufficient "circumstantial guarantees of reliability" to
satisfy the confrontation clause. Id. at 1351; see also Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm,
715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983) (although the statements of a four-year-old molestation victim
"fit squarely within the parameters of a well-recognized and firmly-rooted hearsay exception," the
court went on to note factors that guaranteed the trustworthiness of the statements), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v. Marshall, 113 Wis. 2d 643, 655-56, 335 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (1983)
(court examined the indicia of reliability of the adoptive admission in question, even though it quali-
fied as a firmly rooted hearsay exception).
30. See United States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106
S. Ct. 859 (1986); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
1005 (1982); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981) cer. denied, 464 U.S.
965 (1983); Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C. 1981); State v. Porter, 303 N.C. 680,
696, 281 S.E.2d 377, 388 (1981); State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487 (S.D. 1986); see also United
States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) ("the confrontation clause presents no bar to
the use of extrajudicial statements of a coconspirator ...."); Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d
269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972) (recognizing the coconspirators' statements as admissible under a recognized
exception, therefore satisfying the requirements of the confrontation clause), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1128 (1973).
31. See supra note 29.
32. Holding this latter presumption conclusive poses a significant constitutional danger. A con-
clusive presumption would preclude an accused from arguing that the hearsay admitted against him
was made under circumstances so unreliable as to deny the right to confrontation of witnesses.
Not all statements admissible under a particular hearsay exception possess the same degree of
trustworthiness and reliability. For example, two statements admissible under the same exception
can boast substantially different levels of trustworthiness depending on the self-serving nature of
their content. Assume we are in a jurisdiction which labels as "firmly rooted" spontaneous exclama-
tions. A spontaneous exclamation which is favorable to the interests of the declarant made moments
after an automobile accident does not possess the same degree of reliability as an exclamation ac-
knowledging the declarant's own liability. Similarly, it can be argued that given the underlying
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Roberts itself.33 Despite the Court's opinion that the hearsay statement involved
in Roberts was offered under a firmly rooted former testimony exception, the
justices nonetheless found it necessary to examine the particular circumstances
in which the exception had been applied.34
Yet, recently in Bouraily v. United States 35 the Supreme Court stated that
"the Confrontation Clause does not require a court to embark on an independ-
ent inquiry into the reliability of statements that satisfy the requirements of [a
firmly rooted exception]."' 36 This language, as distinguished from that used by
the Supreme Court in Roberts, suggests that the confrontation clause is auto-
matically, and perhaps even conclusively, satisfied whenever an out-of-court
statement satisfies the statutory requirements of a firmly rooted exception.
The danger inherent in holding this latter presumption to be conclusive is
that no guarantee exists that every statement falling within a firmly rooted ex-
ception will be reliable. The general standard created by the Court in Roberts
provides that "virtually any" statement offered under a firmly rooted exception
will comport with the confrontation clause. The use of the term "virtually any"
appears to acknowledge that some statements admissible under firmly rooted
exceptions will not comport with constitutional requirements. The Supreme
Court presumably did not intend to deny defendants an opportunity to establish
that the particular hearsay offered against them was made under unreliable cir-
cumstances simply because it was offered under a firmly rooted exception.
After all, the due process clause guarantees more than just a ritualistic
trial. 37 The clause is violated when a criminal defendant is convicted on the
basis of unreliable evidence. 3 8 In reality, hearsay falling under many firmly
rooted exceptions may be no more reliable than hearsay offered under non-
firmly rooted exceptions. 39 When hearsay is held to be trustworthy simply by
virtue of falling within a preexisting exception, the defendant may be provided
rationale for the exception, the dying declaration of one who is devoutly religious is more reliable
than that of an atheist who does not fear the consequences of dying with a lie on her lips.
33. For a discussion of the facts of Roberts, see supra note 21.
34. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 67-68; see also C. WHITEBREAD & C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 678 (1986) (circumstances should be analyzed in determining reliability).
35. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
36. Id. at 2783.
37. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17 (1979). In Jackson, the Court concluded that the
due process clause of the fifth amendment of the United States Constitution barred criminal convic-
tion absent proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. This principle was said to be violated by allowing
a properly instructed trier of fact to reach an irrational verdict of guilt. A conviction as a result of a
procedurally correct trial may nonetheless violate due process if the evidence used to support the
conviction is unreliable. Id.
38. See e.g., Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113-14 (1977); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188,
198-99 (1972); Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383-86 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293, 301-02 (1967); Turner v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 466, 471-74 (1965); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257,
273-77 (1948). When a defendant is convicted, that conviction must be based upon a realistic evalu-
ation of the reliability of the evidence submitted against him, not upon unrealistic and unwarranted
assumptions of trustworthiness. The same should be true for any conviction rendered without pro-
viding the accused an opportunity to challenge the prosecution's use of unreliable evidence against
him. This result could occur if the presumption created by the firmly rooted classification was
conclusive.
39. The danger inherent in a conclusive presumption is illustrated below by examining the four
firmly rooted exceptions acknowledged in Roberts: previously cross-examined former testimony,
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with no more than a ritualistic trial-a trial that he enters with the deck consti-
tutionally stacked against him.4° If the presumption were conclusive, it would
foreclose a defendant from arguing a violation of his constitutional rights by
prohibiting him from demonstrating the untrustworthiness of the particular
hearsay offered by the prosecution. 4 1
appropriately administered business and public records, and dying declarations. Roberts, 448 U.S. at
66 n.8. For a discussion of these exceptions, see infra notes 60-100 and accompanying text.
40. A second principle of due process arises out of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302
(1973), in which the Supreme Court held that the mechanical enforcement of anachronistic rules of
evidence cannot be used to deny an accused confrontation and due process of law. In Chambers, the
trial court thwarted defendant's attempts to present evidence that Gable McDonald had confessed to
the murder for which defendant Chambers was on trial. Id. at 289. Because it was defendant who
had called the now-recanting McDonald to the stand, the State's prohibition against parties im-
peaching their own witnesses precluded use of the confession for impeachment. Id. at 291-92. The
United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction, concluding that these evidentiary rules had
denied Chambers his right to due process of law. Id. at 302.
Though analytically the reverse of Chambers, the consequence of classifying as presumptively
constitutional statements admitted under hearsay exceptions that are not legitimately based on in-
herent guarantees of trustworthiness can result in a similar constitutional deprivation. In Chambers,
the accused was denied an opportunity to impeach his own witnesses. The constitutional right of a
criminal defendant to due process of law is violated by the operation of any rule of evidence that
prohibits a defendant from presenting and questioning material witnesses.
Chambers prohibits rules of evidence from controlling the dictates of the Constitution. If all
hearsay admissible under an exception is immune from constitutional attack, then the rule of evi-
dence reigns supreme over the Constitution. Great care must be taken before all hearsay admissible
under a particular exception is made presumptively constitutional. Exceptions should not be catego-
rized as presumptively reliable simply because they have been created by a court or legislature.
Rather, exceptions should be labeled "firmly rooted" only if statements admitted under them com-
port with the requirements of the Constitution.
41. Specifically, it could be argued that the unwarranted classification of an exception as
"firmly rooted" might be contrary to the due process principle established in Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969). Leary illustrates the limits due process places on the use of evidentiary presump-
tions against the criminally accused. Former Harvard Professor Timothy Leary attempted to drive
into Mexico but was refused entry by Mexican border officials. Id. at 9-10. On his return to the
American border checkpoint, Leary was stopped. The ensuing search of his car by American border
guards revealed small quantities of marijuana and three partially smoked marijuana cigarettes. Id.
at 10. Leary was indicted, tried, and convicted of offenses which included having knowingly trans-
ported and facilitated the transportation and concealment of marijuana illegally imported or brought
into the United States, with the knowledge that it was illegally imported or brought in, a violation of
21 U.S.C. § 176a (repealed 1970). Id. at 10-I1 (emphasis added).
Under this statute, the defendant's knowledge of illegal importation of the marijuana seized
from him could be presumed from his possession of the marijuana. The statute stated that "such
possession shall be deemed sufficient evidence to authorize conviction unless the defendant explains
his possession to the satisfaction of the jury." Id. at 30 (quoting 21 U.S.C. § 176a, repealed by Act of
Oct. 27, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, § 1101(a)(2), 84 Stat. 1291, 1292 (1970)). In other words, federal
law provided a rebuttable presumption that all marijuana is imported into the United States and that
everyone who possesses it has knowledge of this fact. The statute thus placed the burden upon the
accused to produce sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption.
After Leary's conviction, he asked the United States Supreme Court to examine the constitu-
tionality of the presumption within 21 U.S.C. § 176a. The Court held the presumption unconstitu-
tional and overturned Leary's conviction, Leary, 395 U.S. at 53, concluding that when any
presumption is used to the detriment of a criminal defendant a " 'rational connection'" must exist
between the underlying preliminary fact and the fact presumed. Id. at 33-34 (quoting Tot v. United
States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-69 (1943)). If there is no "substantial assurance" that the presumed fact is
,more likely than not" to flow from the preliminary fact, the presumption is an unconstitutional
deprivation of due process. Leary, 395 U.S. at 36. This "rational connection" test was established in
Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467-68 (1943). See also United States v. Romano, 382 U.S, 136,
134-41 (1965) (applying the rational connection test of Tot, the Court invalidated a presumption
that mere presence at the site of a distillery was sufficient to justify a conviction of the acctised for
the crime of possession of an illegal distillery). But cf. United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 66-68
(1965) (applying the rational connection test of Tot, the Court sustained the validity of a presump-
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When the prosecution submits hearsay evidence of an absent witness, the
defendant is unable to question that declarant. When a state-created hearsay
exception makes all statements falling within its definition presumptively consti-
tutional, the defendant may not be in a position to effectively challenge the accu-
sations against him and yet may be prevented from constitutionally attacking
this actual denial of confrontation. This lack of an opportunity to question the
witnesses against him will not violate the confrontation rights of defendants in
every case. Some situations in which the defendant is unable to confront the
out-of-court declarant, however, may deny the defendant certain constitutional
protections.
Thus, the presumptively constitutional nature of all statements falling
within firmly rooted exceptions should be rebuttable. The remainder of this Ar-
ticle will analyze the problems inherent in the "firmly rooted" concept even if it
creates only a rebuttable, rather than conclusive, presumption in favor of the
constitutionality of all hearsay falling within such exceptions. Even if this pre-
sumption is rebuttable it still leaves unanswered the question of which excep-
tions qualify as firmly rooted. A workable definition is needed.
III. "FIRMLY ROOTED" DEFINED
In a footnote, the Roberts Court offered four examples of firmly rooted ex-
ceptions: previously cross-examined former testimony, appropriately adminis-
tered business and public records, and dying declarations. 42 It is apparent from
the Court's discussion that these four were not intended to be the only excep-
tions classifiable as firmly rooted. 43 However, had the Court believed that all
tion providing that mere presence at the site of a distillery was sufficient to justify a conviction of the
accused for the crime of running an unlicensed distillery).
Although Leary involved a presumption that supplied a factual element of the offense, the deci-
sion, by analogy, may also demonstrate the due process limits on the use of all evidentiary presump-
tions against criminal defendants. A presumption in favor of the constitutionality of all hearsay
admissible under an exception places the burden on the accused to establish the unreliable nature of
the circumstances under which the statement was made. If no "rational connection" between the
circumstances surrounding the hearsay statement and the presumed fact of the statement's reliability
exists, the right of the accused to due process of law has been violated. See Jaffee, supra note 2, at
303-06. For a somewhat different analysis of the due process clause, see Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S.
74, 96-97 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
42. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
43. Although the Court failed to explain its selection of these exceptions, each arguably falls
within one of the Court's two alternative methods of satisfying confrontation discussed above. See
supra note 23. The Roberts Court concluded that the previous opportunity to cross-examine at a
prior proceeding, such as the preliminary hearing involved in California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970), sufficiently approximates the circumstances surrounding an actual trial so as to satisfy the
demands of the confrontation clause. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 69-70 & n.10. Similarly, when the out-of-
court statement offered by the prosecution is made by a declarant who is now present in court and
available for full and effective cross-examination, the requirement of the confrontation clause has
also been satisfied. See Green, 399 U.S. at 158. The objectionable exceptions arise in situations in
which neither of these exist-when the declarant is presently unavailable for cross-examination and
the defendant has not been previously provided with an opportunity to question the declarant.
Similarly, Roberts classified business and public records, as well as dying declarations, as firmly
rooted presumably because the circumstances under which these out-of-court statements are made
are said to provide reasonable assurance of their trustworthiness. For a discussion of whether these
assumptions of reliability are in fact warranted, see infra notes 71-100 and accompanying text.
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federal hearsay exceptions were firmly rooted it presumably would have said so.
Unfortunately, the Court not only failed to explain its selection of these four
exceptions, but it also provided little guidance for determining which additional
exceptions could be similarly categorized. As mentioned above, the Court sim-
ply stated that "certain hearsay exceptions rest upon such solid foundations that
admission of virtually any evidence within them comports with the 'substance of
the constitutional protection.' "44
Part of the problem lower courts have had in properly classifying excep-
tions stems from the Supreme Court's failure to identify specifically the material
from which the "solid foundations" of a firmly rooted exception were to be built.
As a result of the Supreme Court's failure to communicate the basis of a firmly
rooted exception, some lower courts have equated "firmly rooted" with "long
established."'45 Advocates of this position are likely to find support in the
Supreme Court's recent decision in Bouraily.4 6 The majority opinion, authored
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, held the hearsay exemption for coconspirator state-
ments was "firmly enough rooted in our jurisprudence" so as to qualify as a
firmly rooted exception.47 The Court supported this conclusion not with an
analysis of the reliability safeguards required of the exception, but rather by
stating that the Court's acceptance of this exception dated back to an 1827
decision.48
However, the concept of firmly rooted should not be synonymous with lon-
gevity. An out-of-court assertion may satisfy the requirements of a long-ob-
served hearsay exception, yet not necessarily possess sufficient reliability to meet
the requirements of the confrontation clause.4 9 Thus, longevity alone should
not provide the basis for establishing a statement's compliance with confronta-
tion. The only acceptable meaning of the "solid foundations" demanded by
Roberts is one based on reliability. Any other conclusion would be inconsistent
with the purpose of the confrontation clause as identified in both Dutton and
Roberts.5 0 As noted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,5t "the question of
whether a hearsay exception is 'firmly rooted' does not turn upon how long the
44. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895)).
45. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Vinzant, 522 F.2d 448, 450 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037
(1975) (excited utterance a long-standing exception to the hearsay rule, and does not contravene the
confrontation clause); People v. Nieves, 67 N.Y.2d 125, 131, 492 N.E.2d 109, 112, 501 N.Y.S.2d 1, 4
(1986) (in this dying declarations case, the court favored well-established reliance on specific catego-
ries of hearsay exceptions rather than an amorphous "reliability" test); State v. Marshall, 113 Wis.
2d 643, 655, 335 N.W.2d 612, 617-18 (1983) (adoptive admissions held to be a firmly rooted hearsay
exception which is long established in Wisconsin; citing Richards v. State, 82 Wis. 172, 178, 51 N.W.
652, 653 (1892)); State v. Dorsey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 163, 307 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1981) (coconspirator
statements as an exception to the hearsay rule "well-rooted" in Wisconsin law; citing Baker v. State,
80 Wis. 416, 420, 50 N.W. 518, 520 (1891), which had recognized the well-established admissibility
of statements of a coconspirator).
46. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987); see supra text accompanying notes 35-36.
47. Id. at 2783.
48. Id. (citing United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460 (1827)). For further discus-
sion of Bourjaily see infra notes 178-82 and accompanying text.
49. See supra note 18.
50. See Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
51. State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 370 N.W.2d 745 (1985).
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rule has been accepted but rather how solidly it is grounded on considerations of
reliability and trustworthiness-the very reason for the right to
confrontation." '5 2
Inserting "reliability" into the general standard articulated in Roberts for
defining "firmly rooted" establishes a logically consistent test for determining
which exceptions are to be classified as firmly rooted. The classification of an
exception as firmly rooted depends on whether the requirements of that excep-
tion guarantee the reliability of "virtually any" hearsay falling within it. This
test serves the ultimate goal sought by Roberts, but by itself it is still incomplete.
It fails to demonstrate how to realistically measure guarantees of reliability.
Fortunately, the plurality opinion in Dutton provides some guidance.
The Dutton Court propounded four factors that help to measure indicia of
reliability. 53 According to Dutton, hearsay has a greater likelihood of being
trustworthy when: (1) the out-of-court statement does not contain an express
assertion about a past fact; (2) the possibility is extremely remote that the out-
of-court statement is founded on a faulty recollection; (3) the circumstances
under which the statement was made indicate that the declarant is not misrepre-
senting the facts; and (4) the declarant had personal knowledge of the matters
asserted in the statement. 54 Although compliance with these factors cannot ab-
52. Id. at 709-10, 370 N.W.2d at 759. A recently created exception may be surrounded by
sufficient reliability-insuring requirements so that virtually any statement falling within it will com-
port with the requirements of the confrontation clause. For example, Roberts described the business
records exception as being firmly rooted despite its relatively recent codification. Roberts, 448 U.S.
at 66 n.8; see Johnson v. Lutz, 253 N.Y. 124, 126, 170 N.E. 17, 517-19 (1930) (noting that the
business records exception was not recognized at common law). On the other hand, other exceptions
of ancient origin may not be founded upon trustworthiness and a statement admissible under that
exception should not presumptively comply with the sixth amendment. For a discussion of the
dying declarations exception, which is rooted in antiquity but whose underlying rationale is arguably
not rooted in reliability, see infra notes 88-100 and accompanying text.
53. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89. The Dutton Court also found the importance of the hearsay
relevant to its admission. In particular, the Court noted that the hearsay offered against defendant
Evans was neither "crucial" nor "devastating." Id. at 87. Presumably, if the hearsay statement had
been "crucial" or "devastating," the Court would have required a higher standard of reliability.
54. Id. at 87. These four factors appear to have most significance with respect to hearsay ad-
mitted under nontraditionally recognized exceptions, such as the expanding-equivalency exceptions
of the Federal Rules of Evidence 804(b)(5) and 803(24). In reality, when applied to most previously
codified exceptions, factors (1) and (4) have only minimal application.
For example, with respect to the first factor, it must be remembered that-other than excep-
tions such as those for statements of present mental, emotional, or physical condition, id. 803(3),
occasionally those for present sense impressions, id. 803(1), and those for excited utterances, id.
803(2)-almost all hearsay statements, including the typical hearsay admissible under the four ex-
ceptions described as firmly rooted in Roberts, involve a description of past fact. Thus, if this factor
were strictly applied most hearsay would be excluded. This result was clearly not intended by the
Supreme Court. With respect to the fourth factor, if the declarant's personal knowledge of the
subject matter described in the out-of-court assertion cannot be established, that hearsay statement
will rarely, if ever, be admitted into evidence. See id. 602. Thus, the first factor cannot be complied
with, while the fourth factor would have been complied with regardless of its inclusion by Dutton.
Therefore, only two of the four factors, (2) the possibility that the out-of-court assertion is based on
faulty recollection is extremely remote and (3) misrepresentation of fact by the declarant is unlikely,
have significant practical application to the vast majority of codified exceptions.
With respect to the third consideration, the question arises whether the misrepresentation it
describes encompasses both intentional fabrications and unintentional misrepresentations. Irrespec-
tive of what the Court may have intended, unintentional misrepresentation caused by faulty percep-
tion, for example, is a major underlying reason for the creation of the hearsay rule itself. This
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solutely guarantee reliability, the Supreme Court has concluded that their pres-
ence increases the likelihood of trustworthiness.
Surprisingly, however, Roberts failed even to mention these factors. This
failure to discuss the Dutton factors is a major flaw in the Supreme Court's at-
tempt to set forth a definitive standard for determining which hearsay state-
ments can be admitted without violating the confrontation clause. Not only do
these factors create a framework in which to evaluate statements offered under
non-firmly rooted exceptions, they also assist in determining which exceptions, if
any, should be classified as firmly rooted.
In considering these factors, it must be understood that strict compliance
with all of them could never be required as a precondition to the admission of a
hearsay statement. 5" For example, strict compliance with the first factor, that
the out-of-court statement not contain an assertion of a past fact, would pre-
clude the use of the vast majority of hearsay, because most hearsay contains
some assertion describing how a past event occurred. 56 On the other hand, the
three remaining Dutton factors provide a practical means of evaluating reliabil-
ity of hearsay when offered against a criminal defendant. Thus, to be admissible
under the Dutton test, the particular circumstances under which the statement
was made must suggest that the hearsay is an accurate recollection of something
within the declarant's personal knowledge and that the statement does not con-
tain an intentional or unintentional misrepresentation.5 7
If the Dutton factors are used to determine which exceptions should be clas-
sified as firmly rooted, then the considerations must be different from those in-
volved in determining the admissibility of an individual hearsay statement
offered under a non-firmly rooted exception. When hearsay is offered under a
non-firmly rooted exception, the concern is only with the particularized guaran-
tees of trustworthiness of the individual statement offered in that case. When an
Article will assume the broader interpretation which includes unintentional as well as intentional
misrepresentations.
This conclusion is mandated not merely by the Court's inclusion of this third factor of misrepre-
sentation, but also by factors requiring the declarant's personal knowledge as well as the problems of
faulty recollection. For example, when the court requires that the declarant have personal knowl-
edge of the subject matter of his narrative, it seems to demand both that the declarant observed the
event in question and that his statement describes only the event personally perceived, as opposed to
any additional fact added by error of perception. Clearly, this is also an aspect of the potential
dangers of faulty recollection. Therefore, although not individually articulated by the Court, a de-
mand that the hearsay statement not be based on erroneous, though unintentional misrepresentation
(misperception) exists in the shadow of Dutton's other reliability insuring factors. Cf 3A J. Wic-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 876, at 643-45 (Chadbourn rev. 1970 & Supp. 1987) (inaccuracy of testimony
based on defective qualifications of the observer, such as observation, recollection, or narration, as
opposed to inaccuracy based on other factors, such as moral character or emotional prejudice).
55. For example, in United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1981), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit confirmed that -[a]ll four elements need not be present in
order to satisfy the confrontation clause. In some circumstances, a statement may be admitted over
confrontation clause objections even if it does not pass scrutiny under each prong of the Dutton test."
Id. at 661 (citing United States v. Snow, 521 F.2d 730, 734-35 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1090 (1976)).
56. Although Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89, involved an example of what the Supreme Court de-
cided was a hearsay statement that did not contain an assertion of past fact, the exclusion of all
hearsay statements describing past facts was clearly not the intent of the Court. See supra note 54.
57. See supra note 54.
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exception is categorized as firmly rooted, the court must conclude that virtually
any statement offered under that exception will comport with the requirements
of the confrontation clause. Thus, virtually any statement offered under the
firmly rooted exception must satisfy the Dutton factors for determining
trustworthiness.
Combining the Dutton factors for determining reliability with the general
standard provided in Roberts, exceptions can be constitutionally classified as
firmly rooted only if (1) the exception guarantees the accused a meaningful op-
portunity to question the declarant or (2) the circumstances prerequisite to ad-
mission under that exception realistically assure a substantial likelihood that
virtually any statement offered under it is based on personal knowledge and is
not the product of either faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional mis-
representation. When these assurances are not present, the classification of an
exception as firmly rooted fails to satisfy the confrontation clause standards ar-
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court in Dutton and Roberts.
By classifying exceptions as firmly rooted, a danger exists that courts will
presumptively label as reliable all hearsay admitted solely as the result of long
accepted, but nonetheless unwarranted, assumptions. Just as placing the bur-
den of disproving the case against criminal defendants would make it more
likely that innocent persons might be convicted, similarly, placing the burden of
establishing the untrustworthiness of a hearsay statement on the accused in-
creases the possibility that the confrontation clause will be violated by the use of
unreliable hearsay. Thus, even if the presumption in favor of the constitutional-
ity of hearsay falling within a firmly rooted exception is only rebuttable, it still
unnecessarily increases the likelihood that unreliable evidence will be used to
convict the accused. These problems can be avoided only if courts are required
to examine on a case-by-case basis the "particular guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" to be found in the circumstances in which these statements were made.
5 8
58. See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. Support for this proposal can be found in
the due process clause as well as the confrontation clause. The right of cross-examination and con-
frontation of witnesses is, after all, an essential element of due process. See Smith v. Illinois, 390
U.S. 129 (1968); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934);
Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931). "There are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this
Court and other courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that the
right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental requirement for the
kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 405
(1965) (quoted in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 78 (Brennan, J., dissenting)).
Concurring separately in Pointer, both Justices Harlan and Stewart agreed with the majority as
to the importance of the right of an accused to confront the witness against him. Justice Harlan
went so far as to state that "a right of confrontation is 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,'
reflected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment independently of the Sixth. "
Pointer, 380 U.S. at 408 (Harlan, J., concurring) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325
(1937)). Justice Stewart commented: "The right of defense counsel in a criminal case to cross-
examine the prosecutor's living witnesses is '[o]ne of the fundamental guarantees of life and liberty,'
and 'one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial.' " 380 U.S. at 410 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quot-
ing Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 692 (1931)). Accord Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314,
315 (1969); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 721 (1968); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55-56
(1899).
Furthermore, the due process clause is violated when an accused is convicted on the basis of
untrustworthy evidence. See supra note 37; Goldman, Guilt by Intuition: The Insufficiency of Intcon-
sistent Statements to Convict, 65 N.C.L. REV. 1, 36-38 (1986).
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IV. ROBER TS' FOUR FIRMLY ROOTED EXCEPTIONS
Roberts provided four examples of hearsay exceptions which the Court be-
lieved to be so firmly rooted as to warrant a presumption in favor of the reliabil-
ity of virtually any hearsay statements falling within them.5 9 This section of the
Article examines the underlying rationale for each of these exceptions to deter-
mine whether this inference of reliability is justified, and concludes that substan-
tial doubt exists whether virtually any statement offered under these exceptions
complies with the requirements of the confrontation clause.
A. Former Testimony
Previously cross-examined prior testimony60 is the first exception listed in
Roberts as firmly rooted. The underlying rationale of this exception is quite
distinct. Some lower courts have taken the position that hearsay admitted under
this exception satisfies the requirements of the confrontation clause because of
the inherent reliability of the circumstances under which the testimony was orig-
inally given.6 1 However, the general consensus, including a recent opinion of
59. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
60. Id. The hearsay exception for former testimony provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(I) Former testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same
or a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the course of
the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testimony is now offered, or,
in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest, had an opportunity and similar
motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or redirect examination.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
61. See, e.g., Thomas v. Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1980) (former testimony
possesses sufficient indicia of reliability to comply with the confrontation clause), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 1089 (1981); Younger v. State, 496 A.2d 546, 552 (Del. Super. Ct. 1985) (former testimony
firmly rooted hearsay exception); State v. Mee, 102 Idaho 474, 483, 632 P.2d 663, 672 (1981) (former
testimony inherently reliable); State v. Keairns, 9 Ohio St. 3d 228, 230, 460 N.E,2d 245, 248 (1984)
(former testimony firmly rooted hearsay exception); State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204, 216-20, 377
N.W.2d 175, 176 (1985) (former testimony firmly rooted hearsay exception). The oath, the solem-
nity of the occasion, and the fact that the witness is subject to criminal penalties for perjury suffice to
ensure honesty even in the absence of an opportunity to cross-examine.
The majority in United States ex rel. Haywood v. Wolff, 658 F.2d 455 (7th Cir.) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1088 (1981), noted:
The test for determining whether preliminary hearing testimony is admissible under
the Confrontation Clause, as with all hearsay, is not whether there was an opportunity for
full and complete cross-examination, but whether there are adequate indicia of reliability
to justify its placement before the jury, even though there is no contemporaneous confron-
tation of the declarant.
Id. at 463 (citing Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89; Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66). Applying this test, the major-
ity found that the circumstances under which the declarant originally testified and the degree of
cross-examination that was allowed at the preliminary hearing bore sufficient indicia of reliability to
warrant the testimony's admission. Id. at 463.
Senior Circuit Judge Swygert, however, vehemently dissented, maintaining that the defendant
simply had no opportunity below to adequately cross-examine the declarant at the preliminary hear-
ing under Illinois law. Id. at 464-65 (Swygert, J., dissenting). Illinois law limits cross-examination
at preliminary hearings. Id. at 457 n.5. Instead, Judge Swygert preferred the holding of the district
court, which had concluded that the "petitioner was prevented from adequately testing [the declar-
ant's] recollection and sifting his conscience to satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause."
Id. at 461 (Swygert, J., dissenting).
In Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 385 Mass. 733, 434 N.E.2d 163 (1982), the Supreme Judicial
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the United States Supreme Court in United States v. Inadi,6 2 is to the contrary.
Unlike the other Roberts exceptions, the theory with respect to this exception is
that the accused has already been provided with an opportunity to confront his
accuser. This previous confrontation presumably provides the basis for Roberts'
categorization of this exception as firmly rooted. 63
Court of Massachusetts concluded that "the reliability of the evidence is ensured by the circum-
stances surrounding the giving of the testimony in the first instance and the manner in which the
evidence is preserved and restated at the later trial." Id. at 747, 434 N.E.2d at 171. "The prior
cross-examination of a now unavailable witness before a judicial tribunal provides substantial com-
pliance with the purposes behind the confrontation clause, even though some demeanor evidence
relevant to resolving the issue of credibility is forever lost." Id. at 747-48, 434 N.E. at 172 (citations
omitted); see also Thomas v. Cardwell, 626 F.2d 1375, 1385-86 (9th Cir. 1980) ("there was substan-
tial compliance with the confrontation requirement and sufficient 'indicia of reliability' so that the
jury in appellant's second trial was afforded a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truthfulness of [the
witness'] prior testimony") (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 73; Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216
(1972)), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1089 (1981)).
62. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986). In Inadi the Supreme Court stated:
Unlike some other exceptions to the hearsay rules .... former testimony often is only a
weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of
its own, but is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available and the same
information can be presented to the trier of fact in the form of live testimony, with full
cross-examination and the opportunity to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little
justification for relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence are
available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable as well to Confrontation
Clause analysis, favor the better evidence.
Id. at 1126. On the other hand, when the declarant is presently unavailable but the defendant has
been provided a prior opportunity to confront, the testimony is presumptively constitutional even
when the circumstances surrounding the statement fail to possess "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness." Id.
The Supreme Court had noted this point in a prior decision:
It is true that there has traditionally been an exception to the confrontation require-
ment where a witness is unavailable and has given testimony at previous judicial proceed-
ings against the same defendant which was subject to cross-examination by that defendant.
This exception has been explained as arising from necessity and has been justified on the
ground that the right of cross-examination initially afforded provides substantial compli-
ance with the purposes behind the confrontation requirement.
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 722 (1968) (citations omitted).
63. This conclusion does not suggest that the confrontation clause is violated whenever the
prosecution uses the prior testimony of an unavailable declarant unless previously subject to mean-
ingful questioning by the accused. "The Confrontation Clause does not preclude admission of prior
testimony of an unavailable witness, provided his unavailability is shown and the defendant had an
opportunity to cross-examine." United States v. Johnpole, 739 F.2d 702, 710 (2d Cir.) (citing Mat-
tox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895)), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1075 (1984); see also United States
v. Molt, 772 F.2d 366, 368 (7th Cir. 1985) (interpreting the United States Supreme Court's holding
in Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972)), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1458 (1986); State v. West,
363 So. 2d 513 (La. 1978) (unconfronted former testimony may be still be used against criminal
defendants when it bears sufficient indicia of reliability).
Under the Roberts test, if the defendant has not been personally provided a previous opportu-
nity to question the declarant, as is the case with prior grand jury testimony, the burden rests on the
prosecution to establish that the former testimony possesses particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
Under this rationale, many lower courts have chosen to admit uncross-examined prior grand jury
testimony against criminal defendants. See United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983); United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Garner, 574 F.2d 1141 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 936 (1978); United States v. Carl-
son, 547 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
Because grand jury testimony is not subject to defense questioning, it falls outside the federal
exception for former testimony. See FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(1). Such testimony is then statutorily
admissible in a federal court only if it meets the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5),
one of the expanding exceptions to the hearsay rule. Both this rule and Rule 803(24) permit, under
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The presumptively constitutional classification of previously cross-ex-
amined former testimony should thus be limited to those occasions when the
defendant was personally provided an opportunity to effectively confront the
now unavailable declarant. 64 When the accused has been provided this opportu-
nity, it is difficult to argue that the confrontation clause has not been satisfied.
Thus, this exception would seem to be the most likely for classification as firmly
rooted. However, problems arise with respect to a constitutional presumption in
favor of the admissibility of all hearsay falling within the former testimony ex-
ception employed in some jurisdictions.
For example, some jurisdictions follow a very restrictive policy of defense
questioning at proceedings such as preliminary hearings. 65 On many of these
certain circumstances, the admission of hearsay not falling within the requirements of any specific
exception so long as it was made under sufficiently trustworthy circumstances. Id. 803(24),
804(b)(5). Because neither Rule 804(b)(5) nor Rule 803(24) are firmly rooted exceptions, the pre-
sumption is that hearsay offered under either exception is not constitutionally admissible unless the
prosecution meets its burden of establishing particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. See
United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir.1982) (804(b)(5) not a firmly rooted hearsay
exception), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983). Furthermore, the trustworthiness required as a prereq-
uisite to admission under the Federal Rules of Evidence may not be identical to that needed to
satisfy the confrontation clause. See infra note 75.
This analysis is illustrated by the opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit in United States v. Murphy, 696 F.2d 282 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983).
The Murphy court considered whether former grand jury testimony could be admissible under Fed-
eral Rule of Evidence 804(b)(5) and, if so, whether it met the requirements of the confrontation
clause. Defendants Murphy and Waddell were convicted of two of three counts of bank robbery.
Id. at 283. Their indictment rested in part on the grand jury testimony of an alleged accomplice who
pleaded guilty to one of the counts. Id. When the witness refused to be sworn at the defendant's
trial, he was declared unavailable and his grand jury testimony was admitted into evidence under
Rule 804(b)(5). Id. at 285. While recognizing that the trustworthiness requirement of Rule
804(b)(5) was not necessarily identical to that required by the confrontation clause in Roberts, the
court found the two tests to be similar.
When the problem arises under Rule 804(b)(5), under which the extra-judicial statement
may not come in unless there are circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, the inquir-
ies under the two branches of the problem become closely related. Something more may be
required under the Confrontation Clause, but we are satisfied that there are present in this
case sufficient badges of trustworthiness to meet the tests of Rule 804(b)(5) and of the Sixth
Amendment.
Id. at 286 (emphasis added). Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in
Barlow concluded that, because the "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" required by the
Federal Rules of Evidence are not coextensive with the "particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness" required by Roberts, reliability will not be presumed with regard to grand jury testimony ad-
missible under Rule 804(b)(5). Barlow, 693 F.2d at 964. Thus, a witness' grand jury testimony will
be constitutionally usable by the prosecution only when the prosecution can establish a quantum of
reliability in excess of that required by Rule 804(b)(5). As with all other non-firmly rooted excep-
tions, the prosecution bears the burden of establishing that the hearsay was made under circum-
stances of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness."
This reliability analysis is presumably not required of formerly cross-examined testimony,
which the Supreme Court has concluded is presumptively both reliable and constitutional. Roberts'
interpretation of the holding in Green was that "the opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary
hearing-even absent actual cross-examination-satisfies the confrontation clause." 448 U.S. at 70.
Thus, the exception's presumptive compliance with the confrontation clause would appear to be the
result of the defendants already having had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the time
the former testimony was given.
64. Under Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(1), former testimony is inadmissible in all criminal
cases unless the defendant against whom the testimony is now being offered is the same defendant
who was previously provided the opportunity to question. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
65. See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1201-02 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (defense questioning at a
preliminary hearing may be cut off if it goes beyond a challenge to probable cause to hold to answer
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occasions, the opportunity provided the defendant to cross- examine the now
unavailable declarant may not have been sufficient to comply with the demands
of the sixth amendment. 66 Similarly, if at the time the declarant was confronted
the accused was represented by counsel who incompetently cross-examined the
witness, the opportunity to cross-examine may not have been very meaningful.
67
Additionally, it generally is agreed that a confrontation problem arises
when the former testimony was given at the separate trial of an alleged accom-
plice, and the witness is not presently available to testify at the defendant's
trial.68 Although the alleged accomplice may have had the same motive to
cross-examine as does the present defendant, that alone is not sufficient to satisfy
the accused's right to confrontation. 69 The opportunity previously provided the
defendant to question the now unavailable declarant is what allows former testi-
mony to presumptively satisfy the confrontation clause.
70
for trial and is aimed at discovery); State v. Russo, 101 Wis. 2d 206, 213-14, 303 N.W.2d 846, 849-50
(1981) (defense questioning was cut off because it exceeded proper issues as described under local
standards). But see Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 857, 298 N.E.2d 819, 828 (1973) ("the
judge at a preliminary hearing should allow reasonable latitude to the scope of the defendant's cross-
examination of prosecution witnesses in order to effectuate the ancillary discovery and impeachment
functions of the hearing noted in [Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970)]."); People v. Simmons,
36 N.Y.2d 126, 129, 325 N.E.2d 139, 142, 365 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (1975) (prosecution use of de-
ceased witness' former testimony at defendant's preliminary hearing held inadmissible at trial as a
result of the restrictions imposed on defense cross-examination at preliminary hearing).
66. Twice the United States Supreme Court has concluded that restrictions limiting a defend-
ant's right to cross-examination at a trial have been sufficient to deny the accused his constitutional
right to confrontation. See Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford v. United States, 282 U.S.
687 (1931); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 298 (1973) (state rule of evidence which
precluded the defendant from cross-examining his own witness with respect to his prior inconsistent
statements was held a denial of due process).
67. But see Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 214 (1972) (rejected defense claim that because
prior trial counsel's performance had been constitutionally ineffective, all cross-examination con-
ducted by said counsel must be held incompetent per se).
68. Commentators have stated:
A graver constitutional problem would be presented if prior testimony were proffered
against an accused who was not party to the prior proceeding. Even if the party against
whom the testimony was initially offered had the same motive and interest to cross-ex-
amine as the present accused, the fact remains that the witness never testified in the ac-
cused's presence and that he personally never examined the witness. Though physical
presence is not critical in confrontation (as it is not in hearsay exceptions such as dying
declarations and co-conspirators statements which have received constitutional sanction),
the failure of the accused to conduct the examination himself raises the question of whether
it is compatible with his right of counsel and right of confrontation to make him bear the
consequence of any prior inadequacies in cross-examination.
In any event, so far as federal criminal cases are concerned, the issue is no longer
open. Congress narrowed Rule 804(b)(1) so that the defendant against whom the testi-
mony is now offered had to be the party in the prior proceeding. Another party, no matter
how closely allied in interest or motive, will not do.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(1)[05], at 804-96 to -98 (footnotes omitted).
69. 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(1)[05], at 804-97. "The question is
not whether cross-examination can be dispensed with but whether cross-examination by another in a
criminal case ensures its reliability." Id.
70. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 74 (in criminal cases, prosecution must show a good faith effort to
locate witness against the accused); Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 724-25 (1968) (when the witness
was incarcerated in another state, the confrontation clause required prosecution to make good faith
efforts to produce witness at trial before preliminary hearing testimony could be introduced); Gov-
ernment of Virgin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 550 (3rd Cir. 1967) (witness' absence from trial
court's jurisdiction insufficient to establish unavailability; prosecution must make an effort to secure
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Thus, because so many situations arise in which former testimony will not
satisfy the demands of confrontation, a legitimate question exists as to the wis-
dom of creating a presumption in favor of the constitutionality of this entire
hearsay exception. Compliance with the confrontation clause can be accurately
determined only by examining the former testimony each time it is offered.
B. Business and Public Records
Roberts classified the business 7' and public records exceptions 72 as firmly
rooted because they have been considered to be among the most reliable of hear-
say exceptions. 73 The supposed reliability of these exceptions is founded upon
the theory that "records of regularly conducted activities cannot fulfill their
function . . . unless they are accurate. Thus, the motive for accuracy is great,
while the motive to falsify is virtually non-existent."'74
Despite the faith the Supreme Court seems to have placed in their reliabil-
ity, business and public records may still reflect unintentional errors or even
intentional distortions caused by self-interest. Prior to Roberts' classification of
these exceptions as firmly rooted, federal circuit courts had split over whether
the witness' voluntary return and show that the witness would have refused to cooperate); McCoR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 253, at 756-57.
71. The exception for business records provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(6) Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data
compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or
near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in
the course of a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of
that business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, all as
shown by the testimony of the custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthi-
ness. The term "business" as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, associa-
tion, profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
FED. R. EVID. 803(6).
72. The exception for public records provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(8) Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in
any form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
agency, or (13) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which matters there
was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases matters observed by police
officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil actions and proceedings and
against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings resulting from an investigation
made pursuant to authority granted by law, unless the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate lack of trustworthiness.
Id. 803(8).
73. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8; United States v. Keplinger, 572 F. Supp. 1068, 1070 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
74. Keplinger, 572 F. Supp. at 1070. "The reliability of business records is supplied by regular-
ity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon
them, and by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation. The
inherent reliability of business records makes the utility of cross-examination minimal." Id. (cita-
tions omitted); see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 306; 4 J. WEINSTIN & M. BtiEiR,
supra note 2, 803(6)[01]; 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1522.
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hearsay admissible under these exceptions would always comply with the dic-
tates of the confrontation clause. 75 The danger of intentional distortion is par-
ticularly prevalent when the records are prepared in anticipation of possible
litigation.76 To avoid this possibility and enhance the likelihood of trustworthi-
ness, some jurisdictions specifically provide that these records may be excluded
if the method of preparation or the source of the information suggest their unre-
liability.77 Acknowledging this latter proposition, the Federal Rules of Evidence
permit the admission of regularly recorded documents "unless the source of in-
formation or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trust-
worthiness."'78 Perhaps the Roberts Court intended to limit the classification of
firmly rooted only to those exceptions including a trustworthiness requirement,
when the Court restricted the category to only those business and public records
75. See United States v. Leal, 509 F.2d 122, 127 (9th Cir. 1975) (complied with confrontation
clause); United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295, 1298 (9th Cir. 1971) (complied with confrontation
clause); McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785, 789 (5th Cir.) ("right of confrontation may not be
invoked to exclude evidence otherwise admissible under well-established legitimate exceptions to the
hearsay rule"), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965). In McDaniel, the court held:
We do not believe that all documents covered by the [Business Records] Statute in all cases
are admissible in a criminal trial, but the trial judge has the duty to determine in each
instance whether such documents are constitutionally admissible under the Sixth Amend-
ment guarantee of confrontation.
McDaniel, 343 F.2d at 789; accord United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(preferring the McDaniel approach because "[s]uch a balancing test is clearly appropriate").
76. One commentator has stated:
Special principles attend the admissibility of business records prepared in anticipation
of litigation, and courts are especially careful to scrutinize such records as accident reports
and hospital records, because these records have proven peculiarly subject to distortion and
self-interest. Where a document generally satisfies the elements of rule 803(6), but never-
theless was prepared in anticipation of possible use in litigation, the underlying rationale of
trustworthiness is undercut.
Weissenberger, Hearsay: Business Records and Public Records, 51 U. CIN. L. REV. 42, 54 (1982)
(footnotes omitted).
77. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6); 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 803(6)[07], [08],
at 803-204 to -225. "Even where a business record satisfies all the requirements of rule 803(6), it
nevertheless may be excluded on objection from the opponent where the trial court, in its discretion,
determines that the source of the information or the method of its preparation indicates that the
resultant record is untrustworthy." Weissenberger, supra note 76, at 4 (footnote omitted)
78. FED. R. EVID. 803(6). This potential for untrustworthiness gave rise to the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). In Palmer the Court pre-
cluded a defendant railroad company from submitting into evidence its own accident report pre-
pared two days after the incident that was the subject of the litigation. Id. at 111. The Palmer
opinion ostensibly excludes all business records authored with an eye towards litigation when offered
by the author. Id. at 113-14. The case is also cited as authority for the general proposition that only
trustworthy records should be admitted under this exception. For cases relying on Palmer to ex-
clude unreliable business records, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 308, at 877 &
n.25.
The former version of the federal rule governing the admission of business records considered
trustworthiness as going to the weight rather than the admissibility of the out-of-court document.
One court noted:
The newly enacted version, on the other hand, recognizes that evidence otherwise meeting
the requirements of FRE 803(6) may now be inadmissible because "the source of informa-
tion or the methods or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness."
This complete reversal of philosophy is apparently a legislative ratification of the many
cases, such as Pahner v. Hoffman, which had read implied exceptions into the language of
the old statute despite the fact that the purport of the statute was clear on its face.
United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 80 n.33 (2d Cir. 1977) (citations omitted) (quoting FED. R.
EvID. 803(6)).
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that are "[p]roperly administered." '79
The definition of trustworthiness as provided by statute, however, may be
significantly different than that required by the Constitution. Both the sixth and
eighth circuits have acknowledged that evidence satisfying a statutory require-
ment of trustworthiness, such as that required of hearsay admissible under the
business records or the catchall exceptions, may still not necessarily meet the
demands of the confrontation clause.80 Thus, the prosecution's use of business
or public records may meet the demands of a hearsay exception and yet not
always satisfy the demands of confrontation.
The primary example of the prosecution's attempt to use business or public
records of questionable reliability for confrontation purposes is when the hear-
say is contained in probation, police chemist, or arrest reports and the author is
unavailable.8 1 In United States v. Oates8 2 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit held that government records, such as police arrest re-
ports, prepared in anticipation of defendant's criminal prosecution could not be
admitted under either Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), the so-called business
records exception, or Rule 803(8), the public records exceptionA83 Although
Rules 803(8)(B) and (C) explicitly limit the admission of public records under
79. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
80. See United States v. Barlow, 693 F.2d 954, 964 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945
(1983); United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
Whenever a jurisdiction condones the use of unreliable business or public records against crimi-
nal defendants, those defendants have no other recourse but to seek protection in the confrontation
and due process clauses. Yet, the actual untrustworthiness of individual records may not sufficiently
emerge to overcome the presumptively constitutional nature of business and public records.
81. See infra notes 83-84.
82. 560 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1977). At Oates' trial for possession of heroin with intent to distribute
and conspiracy, the court admitted into evidence a hearsay report from an apparently unavailable
chemist, analyzing the white powdery substance seized from Oates' alleged accomplice as heroin.
Id. at 64.
83. The court wrote:
[Ain overriding concern of the Advisory Committee was that the rules be formulated so as
to avoid impinging upon a criminal defendant's right to confront the witnesses against him.
The Advisory Committee, in unequivocal language, offers the specter of collision with the
confrontation clause as the explanation for the presence of FRE 803(8)(C) in its proposed(and, since FRE 803(8)(C) was unaltered during the legislative process, final) form:
"In one respect, however, the rule with respect to evaluative reports under [Rule
803(8)(C)] is very specific: they are admissible only in civil cases and against the govern-
ment in criminal cases in view of the almost certain collision with confrontation rights which
would result from their use against an accused in a criminal case."
Id. at 68-69 (quoting FED. R. EvID. 803(8) advisory committee notes).
Representative Hungate who acted as floor manager for the legislation noted:
As the rules of evidence now stand, police and law enforcement reports are not admissible
against defendants in criminal cases. This is made quite clear by the provisions of rule
803(8)(B) and (C). Police reports, especially in criminal cases, tend to be one-sided and
self-serving. They are frequently prepared for the use of prosecutors, who use such reports
in deciding whether to prosecute. The danger of unfair prejudice inherent in such reports
is heightened where-as proposed in the Senate's rule 804(b)(5)-the officer who prepared
the report is not available to take the stand and be cross-examined about it. There was
some thought that the Senate's rule would raise a constitutional question of the right to
confrontation.
120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (quoted in part in Oates, 560 F.2d at 69-70).
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these circumstances, the court found a similar design in the trustworthiness re-
quirement of Rule 803(6), even though not explicit in the language of the Rule.8 4
After extensively examining the legislative history of each exception, the court of
appeals concluded that "it simply makes no sense to surmise that Congress ever
intended that these records could be admissible against a defendant in a criminal
case under any of the Federal Rules of Evidence's exceptions to the hearsay
rule."8' 5 The Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of Evidence believed
that this rule, prohibiting the use of hearsay arrest reports against criminal de-
fendants, was necessary to avoid "the almost certain collision with confrontation
rights which would result from [the] use [of such records] against an accused in
a criminal trial."'8 6
Oates, however, is a decision of statutory, and not constitutional, dimen-
sion. The confrontation clause concerns expressed by both the Oates court and
Congress have not been repeated in every jurisdiction. Thus, in the absence of
constitutional analysis, a lower court could choose to admit a police or arrest
report as falling within either the business or public records exceptions. 87 Be-
cause these exceptions are firmly rooted, an accused who attempts to challenge
the constitutional use of these hearsay reports would be in the awkward position
of having to overcome a presumption in favor of their trustworthiness. No pre-
sumption should favor the constitutional admission of this type of hearsay.
Even though these may be the "most reliable" of exceptions, considerable doubt
still exists that "virtually any" statement offered under them will comport with
the demands of the confrontation clause.
84. Representative David Dennis, a floor manager of the legislation and a member of the Com-
mittee of Conference, noted:
I would like to say in answer to my friend, the gentlewoman from New York, that this
business of using a police report, if a policeman is unavailable, was not in the rules as they
came to us. That was written in by the Senate, and we struck it out in the conference, I am
very happy to say. It was a terrible idea. But since we did take it out in the conference,
and since it is gone, and since we insisted that it go, I cannot see how anybody could
suggest that introducing such a report is possible or a thing that could be done under these
rules; because the Senators put it in and we took it out in conference, and that is the
legislative history.
120 Cong. Rec. 40,891 (1974) (quoted in Oates, 560 F.2d at 71-72).
85. Oates, 560 F.2d at 78.
86. Id. at 69. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit:
While it might be proper to admit a police record as a business record to prove the date an
automobile theft has been reported to the police, it would strike at the core of the Sixth
Amendment to admit a police report summarizing the prosecution's entire case against a
defendant in the absence of the maker of the record. Such a procedure would do no less
than allow the prosecution to proceed without allowing the defendant the opportunity to
cross-examine what may be his sole accuser.
United States v. Smith, 521 F.2d 957, 966 n.20 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (citations omitted).
87. See Holcomb v. State, 307 Md. 457, 515 A.2d 213 (1986). In Holcomb. the court admitted
a police report against a criminal defendant as a business record. "In general, those portions of the
report of a police investigation which record the facts obtained by the direct sense impressions of the
investigating officer are admissible as a business record .... ." Id. at 461-62. 515 A.2d at 215.
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C. Dying Declarations
The dying declaration exception 8 is clearly well rooted in antiquity. The
exception "dates back as far as the first half of the 1700s-the period when the
hearsay rule was coming to be systematically and strictly enforced . . . ."89 As
one commentator observed:
The theory is that all self-serving designs and motives to misstate the
truth vanish in a man who is conscious of his imminent death since the
fear of punishment in an afterlife negates any impulses of greed, hate,
or revenge. Even for an individual who lacks strong religious beliefs,
the awesome confrontation with death and the unknown is thought to
register a sobering impact.90
Presumably, this long accepted rationale led the Roberts Court to catego-
rize this exception as firmly rooted. Indeed, the Advisory Committee to the
Federal Rules of Evidence chose to preserve and broaden9 the exception, con-
cluding that "it can scarcely be doubted that powerful psychological pressures
are present" which give such statements reliability.92 This underlying justifica-
tion, however, may not accurately reflect the contemporary psychological reality
of a society more secular than the one in which the exception originated. Even
the Advisory Committee acknowledged that "the original religious justification
for the exception may have lost its conviction for some persons over the years
"93
Empirical data from various studies suggests that the pressures which favor
the reliability of dying declarations may be outweighed by other factors. For
example, considerable evidence suggests that the pressures on which the Advi-
sory Committee relied often do not sufficiently negate emotions, such as revenge.
Thus, untruths by the dying are far from a rare occurrence. 94
88. Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(2) provides:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(2) Statement under belief of impending death. In a prosecution for homicide or in a
civil action or proceeding, a statement made by a declarant while believing that his death
was imminent, concerning the cause or circumstances of what he believed to be his im-
pending death.
FED. R. EVID. (804)(b)(2).
89. 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, § 1430, at 275; see also Ryan, Dying Declarations in Civil
Actions, 10 B.U.L. REV. 470 (1930) (crediting Thayer with tracing dying declarations back to a case
from the year 1202).
90. Goetsch, Dying Declarations: Connecticut Common Law and the New Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 50 CONN. B.J. 424, 428 (1976). See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 2, §§ 1438-43, at
289-304 (outlining the history behind the dying declaration exception).
91. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide that, unlike the common-law dying declaration ex-
ception, such statements are admissible in civil cases as well as criminal, are not excluded when the
declarant believed he or she was dying but recovered, and are presently unavailable for a reason
other than death due to the circumstances that give rise to the statement. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(2),
92. Id. advisory committee notes.
93. Id. advisory committee notes.
94. One commentator has noted:
Even the presence of powerful psychological forces does not necessarily guarantee that a
man will abandon his instincts of hate, revenge, self interest, or greed. On the contrary,
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Other factors also militate against the guarantee of trustworthiness tradi-
tionally associated with dying declarations. Any statement by a dying person is
likely to be influenced by the inevitable mental stress and confusion caused by
physical trauma or pain, as well as by medication.9 5 Furthermore, because dy-
ing declarations are traditionally admissible only in cases of homicide, the de-
clarant is likely to be more traumatized and confused than the usual deathbed
declarant. 96 Nor is an individual witnessing a dying declaration inclined to criti-
cally examine the statement's content. 97 These witnesses are not likely to have
adequate training to recognize whether the declarant's mind was sufficiently free
from stress and trauma to perceive and tell the truth.98 As one judge has noted:
Certainly, an accused should not be deprived of his constitutional right
to confrontation ... on a theory that meets neither the test of reason
nor of the facts of common knowledge and human experience. This
harmful effect of the admission of this type of hearsay is enhanced by a
recital of dramatic circumstances under which the statement is alleged
to have been made, and, the law having in effect declared this type of
hearsay sacrosanct, there is no effective way to challenge its truth and
it is more than just likely that the jury will attach undue importance to
it and give it undue weight in arriving at a verdict.9 9
Thus, when measured against contemporary realities, no reasonable assur-
ance exists that "virtually any" hearsay falling within this exception will sub-
stantially comport with the Dutton factors for evaluating indicia of reliability. 1t°
This hearsay may not be based on personal knowledge and may be the product
of either faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional misrepresentation.
there is evidence of individuals making patently false statements for vengeful purposes at
the point of death. In addition, the presence of mental stress and physical trauma is clearly
not conducive to clear perceptions or objective narration. Severe pain, medication, and the
presence of family and friends may all serve to distort and unduly influence the memory
and motives of the victim.
Goetsch, supra note 90, at 446-47.
95. Goetsch, supra note 90, at 446-47.
96. A commentator has written:
Most homicides are violent or passionate and many are victim-precipitated or at least
partly so .... People daily operate on incomplete or inaccurate perception or data-so
much so that they do not notice-and all of us are capable of lying, prevaricating, in-
venting, disregarding, or acting out wishes and hatred. When people are shocked by their
own, unexpected, imminent deaths, their immediate reaction is rage, even at God, religion,
and morality. Various of these factors may merge around a homicide or suicide victim's
injury and final experiences and may preclude reliable perception, analysis, and
communications.
Jaffee, supra note 2, at 291.
97. "[W]itnesses tend to accept the statements of dying men rather than subject them to critical
examination." Goetsch, supra note 90, at 447.
98. "If a witness to a dying declaration were not skilled enough to know whether the declar-
ant's mind was truly unimpaired by the fatal trauma, how could a court be sure of the declaration's
trustworthiness?" Jaffee, supra note 2, at 313.
99. Kidd v. State, 258 So. 2d 423, 430 (Miss. 1972) (Smith, J., concurring). Judge Smith ar-
gued that "the admission of this type of hearsay evidence should not be countenanced by the courts
in any case, but certainly, in criminal cases, where a man may lose his liberty as the result of it, it
should never be admitted." Id.
100. Dution, 400 U.S. at 88-89 (listing factors indicating reliability of hearsay statements). For a
discussion of the Dutton factors see supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text.
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Hearsay statements offered under this exception, even more so than the preced-
ing three firmly rooted exceptions listed in Roberts, lack sufficient likelihood of
trustworthiness to warrant characterization as presumptively constitutional.
The uncertain assumptions that give rise to the dying declaration exception not
only illustrate the dangers inherent in describing firmly rooted exceptions as
conclusively constitutional, but they also cast doubt on the wisdom of admitting
them under even a rebuttable presumption in favor of their constitutionality.
V. EXPANDING THE LIST OF FIRMLY ROOTED EXCEPTIONS
Lower courts have added numerous exceptions to the ranks of the firmly
rooted. Unfortunately, Roberts' failure to define exactly what is required for
this classification has resulted in disagreement among lower courts as to which
additional exceptions qualify under that rubric. The list of exceptions that lower
courts have labeled firmly rooted includes spontaneous exclamations,' 0' present
sense impressions,1 0 2 adoptive admissions,10 3 declarations against penal inter-
est, 1° 4 and statements by a coconspirator.10 5 Because none of these exceptions
101. See United States v. Moore, 791 F.2d 566, 574 (7th Cir. 1986); Haggins. v. Warden, Fort
Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050, 1058 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 (1984); State v.
Jeffers, 135 Ariz. 404, 422, 661 P.2d 1105, 1123, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 865 (1983); State v. Yslas, 676
P.2d 1118, 1122-23 (Ariz. 1983); Harrison v. United States, 435 A.2d 734, 736 (D.C. 1981); State v.
Porter, 303 N.C. 680, 691-94, 281 S.E.2d 377, 388 (1981); State v. Bawdon, 386 N.W.2d 484, 487
(S.D. 1986); see also McLaughlin v. Vinzant, 522 F.2d 448, 450 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1037
(1975) (excited utterance, a long standing exception to the hearsay rule, does not contravene the
confrontation clause); Harmon v. Anderson, 495 F. Supp. 341, 344 (E.D. Mich. 1980) (excited utter-
ance is reliable and long established exception to the hearsay rule); People v. Grover, 451 N.E.2d
587, 591 (Ill. App. 1983) (excited utterance exception bears sufficient indicia of reliability).
102. See, e.g., Brown v. Tard, 552 F. Supp. 1341, 1351 (D.N.J. 1982) (reliability can be inferred
for statements falling within hearsay exception for present sense impressions).
103. See, eg., United States v. Monks, 774 F.2d 945, 952 (9th Cir. 1985) (adoptive admissions
firmly rooted, although the Ninth Circuit rejected proposition that firmly rooted exceptions auto-
matically satisfy the confrontation clause, at least with respect to statements of coconspirators);
Poole v. Perini, 659 F.2d 730, 733 (6th Cir. 1981) (adoptive confession avoids confrontation prob-
lem), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 910 (1982); United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1197-98 (9th Cir.)
(adoptive admissions automatically satisfy the confrontation clause), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 979
(1979); Graves v. United States, 490 A.2d 1086, 1106 (D.C. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 814
(1986); State v. Marshall, 113 Wis. 2d 643, 655, 335 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1983); see also United States
v. McKinney, 707 F.2d 381, 387 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1983) (Belloni, J., dissenting) (adoptive admission
does not violate the confrontation clause); United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 904-05 (9th Cir.
1981) (adoptive admission admitted without addressing the confrontation clause), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 1027 (1982).
104. See, e.g., United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d 769, 775-76 (2d Cir. 1983), cerl. denied,
464 U.S. 1040 (1984); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 965 (1983); People v. Geoghegan, 51 N.Y.2d 45, 52, 409 N.E.2d 975, 978, 431 N.Y.S.2d 502,
503 (1980) (Jasen, J., dissenting) (declaration against penal interest inherently reliable); State v. Val-
ladares, 31 Wash. App. 63, 72 n.4, 639 P.2d 813, 818 n.4, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 99 Wash. 2d
663, 664 P.2d 508 (1983); State v. Buelow, 122 Wis. 2d 465, 479, 363 N.W.2d 255, 263 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1984); State v. Dorcey, 98 Wis. 2d 718, 722, 298 N.W.2d 213, 216 (Wis. Ct. App. 1980), aff'd,
103 Wis. 2d 152, 307 N.W.2d 612 (1981); see also United States v. West, 574 F.2d 1131, 1138 (4th
Cir. 1978) (declaration against penal interest possesses sufficient indicia of reliability).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Chindawongse, 771 F.2d 840, 846-47 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 863 (1986); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 812-13 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris,
J., concurring in part); United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 987 n.7 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 993 (1983); United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981) (statements admissible
under the coconspirators exception to the hearsay rule do not violate the confrontation clause), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1005 (1982); United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
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require that the accused be provided with either a present or prior opportunity
to question the hearsay declarant, their classification as firmly rooted must rest
upon a trustworthiness analysis. These exceptions must be examined to deter-
mine whether each possesses sufficient inherent guarantees of trustworthiness to
justify a constitutional presumption in favor of its use against criminal
defendants.
A. Spontaneous Exclamations and Present Sense Impressions
Although the spontaneous exclamation 10 6 and present sense impression 0 7
exceptions rest upon slightly different underlying rationales, they share a com-
mon basis for their existence. 0 8 The presumed reliability of both exceptions is
denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983); State v. Dorsey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 162, 307 N.W.2d 612, 617 (1981); see
also United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (adopting a per se rule admitting
statements of a coconspirator without violating the confrontation clause); Ottomano v. United
States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (Ist Cir. 1972) (because coconspirators' statements admissible under a
recognized hearsay exception, defendant's confrontation argument was held to be without merit),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973). For cases holding the coconspirator exception not firmly rooted,
see United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 638-40 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985);
United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983); United
States v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 660 & 660 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31,
37-38 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Kelley, 526 F.2d 615, 620-21
(8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 971 (1976).
106. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(2) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(2) Excited utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
FED. R. EVID. 803(2).
107. Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1) provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
able as a witness:
(1) Present sense impression. A statement describing or explaining an event or condi-
tion made while the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately
thereafter.
Id. 803(l).
The present sense impression exception first appeared in the writings of Professor Thayer, who
proposed an exception for declarations of fact which were very near in time to that which they
tended to prove. See Thayer, Bedingfield's Case-Declarations as a Part of the Res Gestae, 15 AM. L.
REV. 71, 107 (1881). However, courts did not readily accept this exception for unexcited statements
of present sense impressions. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 298, at 861. For an
early case recognizing this exception, see Houston Oxygen Co. v. Davis, 139 Tex. 1, 5, 161 S.W.2d
474, 477 (1942). In Houston Oxygen, the out-of-court assertion offered by the defendant in a civil
action was a description made by a declarant when the plaintiff's car had just passed, stating that
"they must have been drunk, that we would find them somewhere on the road wrecked if they kept
that rate of speed up." The court noted that the statement had not been made under the stress of
emotion. Id. In spite of this, the statement was found to be "sufficiently spontaneous to save it from
the suspicion of being manufactured evidence." Id. at 6, 161 S.W.2d at 476. For a discussion of
Houston Oxygen, see Waltz, The Present Sense Impression Exception to the Rule Against Hearsay:
Origins and Attributes, 66 IOWA L. REV. 869, 883 (1981).
108. Both the spontaneous exclamation and present sense impression exceptions to the hearsay
rule codified part of the criticized res gestae doctrine. "The marvelous capacity of a Latin phrase to
serve as a substitute for reasoning, and the confusion of thought inevitably accompanying the use of
inaccurate terminology, are nowhere better illustrated than in the decisions dealing with the admissi-
bility of evidence as "res gestae.'" Morgan, A Suggested Classification of Utterances Admissible as
Res Gestae, 31 YALE L.J. 229 (1922); see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 288, at
835-36 (describing the origins of the phrase resgestae); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 1745, 1767, at
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partially founded on assumptions concerning the immediate proximity of the
remarks to the event described.10 9 Hearsay admissible under either exception is
theoretically said to be credible, at least in part, for two reasons: first, these
statements are expressions of an immediate perception unhampered by the po-
tential blurrings and fadings of memory; 110 and, second, the contemporaneous
nature of the remarks increases the likelihood that insufficient time was available
for fabrication."'I As a result, the statement is said to accurately describe the
observed event.' 12 On closer examination, however, these rationales are based
191-93, 253-56 (Chadbourn rev. 1976) (explaining the difference between "spontaneous exclama-
tions" and "verbal acts" as part of res gestae); Waltz, supra note 107, at 871-75; Comment, The
Present Sense Impression Exception to the Hearsay Rule: Federal Rule of Evidence 803(1), 81 DICK.
L. REV. 347, 348-50 (1976) (stating that the resgestae concept obscures understanding of exceptions
to the hearsay rule). This doctrine was often, though not exclusively, used as a catchall method for
admitting hearsay that would otherwise have been excluded. In particular, res gestae was applied to
admit hearsay that described events during or immediately after their occurrence.
The term res gestae seems to have come into common usage in discussions of admissi-
bility of statements accompanying material acts or situations in the early 1800's. At this
time the theory of hearsay was not well developed, and the various exceptions to the hear-
say rule were not clearly defined. In this context, the phrase res gestae served as a conve-
nient vehicle for escape from the hearsay rule in two primary situations. In the first, it was
used to explain the admissibility of statements that were not hearsay at all. In the second,
it was used to justify the admissibility of statements which today come within the[se] four
exceptions . . . : (1) statements of present bodily condition, (2) statements of present
mental states and emotions, (3) excited utterances, and (4) statements of present sense
impressions.
Two main policies or motives are discernible in this recognition of res gestae as a
password for the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence. One is a desire to permit
each witness to tell his story in a natural way .... The other policy, emphasized by J.
Wigmore and those following his leadership, is the recognition of spontaneity as the source
of special trustworthiness. This quality ofspontaneity characterized to some degree nearly
all types of statements which have been labeled res gestae.
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 288, at 835-36.
109. See 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 1749, at 199; Morgan, supra note 108, at 236-37;
Comment, supra note 108, at 353-57.
110. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 1750(b), at 202-03; see infra note 114.
111. 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 1750(b), at 202-03; see Foster, Present Sense Impressions:
An Analysis and Proposal, 10 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 299, 317-18 (1979). Additionally, the present sense
impression is sometimes said to be based on a third underlying rationale, founded on the belief that
the individual who testifies to the declarant's out-of-court statement was presumably present to
observe the same event and can thus be cross-examined as to the accuracy of the declarant's re-
marks. Foster, supra, at 335; see Morgan, supra note 108, at 236; Comment, supra note 108, at 355.
However, even if the testifying witness' presence was required, it does not guarantee that the witness
would have been in a position to adequately observe the event described or have any independent
recollection of what occurred. Even assuming the analytical accuracy of this third rationale, it has
not been incorporated into the Federal Rules of Evidence. See FED. R. Evil. 803(1). Under the
federal exception for present sense impressions, the trial witness who now repeats the declarant's
out-of-court statements need not be present at the time the event occurred. Id. "[T]he Advisory
Committee's position seems to be that the testifying witness may be cross-examined regarding the
surrounding circumstances and that whatever factors minimize the trustworthiness of the statement
should go to the weight but not the admissibility of the evidence." 4 J. BAILEY & 0. TRELLES, THE
FEDERAl. RULES OF EVIDENCE: LEGISLATIVE HISTORIES AND RE.ATED DOCUMENTS 163 (1980).
112. Wigmore has written:
This general principle is based on the experience that, under certain external circum-
stances of physical shock, a stress of nervous excitement may be produced which stills tile
reflective faculties and removes their control, so that the utterance which then occurs is a
spontaneous and sincere response to the actual sensations and perceptions already pro-
duced by the external shock. Since this utterance is made under the immediate and uncoil-
trolled domination of the senses, and during the brief period when considerations of self-
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on questionable psychological assumptions.
An inherent flaw in the first rationale is that it depends completely on the
assumptions that descriptive accuracy is a natural consequence of observation' 13
and that this accurate observation is preserved by a contemporaneous state-
ment.1 14 These assumptions, however, are rarely warranted. The "cognitive
processes of the human organism are not the equivalent of a photographic pro-
cess which renders and preserves an essentially accurate counterpart of some
event." t 5 These cognitive powers do not operate in a vacuum," 6 but are influ-
enced by other factors and emotions, including unidentifiable subconscious influ-
ences which can vary greatly according to the relative circumstances
surrounding the observer."1 7 Even if spontaneity results in less opportunity for
the declarant's memory to fade, the possibility that he may have inaccurately
observed the event remains. 1 8
interest could not have been brought fully to bear by reasoned reflection, the utterance may
be taken as particularly trustworthy . . . and thus as expressing the real tenor of the
speaker's belief as to the facts just observed by him ....
6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, § 1747, at 195.
113. For a discussion of the psychological concept of the "logical completion mechanism,"
which results in unconsciously distorted perceptions, see A. TRANKELL, RELIABILITY: METHODS
FOR ANALYZING AND ASSESSING WITNESS STATEMENTS 18 (1972); see generally Buckout, Psychol-
ogy and Eyewitness Identification, 2 L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 75 (1976) (discussing the unreliability
of eyewitness identification); Lezak, Some Psychological Limitations on Witness Reliability, 20
WAYNE L. REV. 117 (1973) (stating that eyewitness testimony is inherently unreliable).
114. That a statement was made nearer in time to the event it allegedly describes could be an
argument in favor of admitting any hearsay statement and would thus potentially spell the demise of
the hearsay rule. In the absence of other reliability-ensuring factors, however, relative nearness in
time has never provided the sole basis for justifying the creation of any exception. The contempora-
neous nature of the statement to the event described, not simply the fact that the statement was
made nearer in time to the event than the witness' trial testimony, is said to give these statements
reliability. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
115. Stewart, Perception, Memory, and Hearsay: A Criticism of Present Law and the Proposed
Federal Rules of Evidence, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 1, 21 (1970). Professor Stewart concludes:
The degree of correspondence between the testimony of an event and the reality it purports
to represent may... vary widely according to the effect of numerous factors. The impera-
tives of successful adaptation do not require that the individual's cognitive process operate
in all instances to provide information having the degree of objective accuracy necessary
for accurate, after-the-fact reconstruction which is attempted by judicial fact
determination.
Id.
116. "[I]t is virtually impossible to ascertain whether the utterance is generated by the episode
observed or by the operation of the declarant's mental processes, even where the declaration is emit-
ted virtually instantaneously upon cognizance of the event. Yet it is speed which usually forms the
crux of the spontaneity requirement." Foster, supra note 111, at 325-26 (footnote omitted).
117. Professor Foster suggests that when an individual perceives an event, the individual
arbitrarily selects signals from among a universe of sensory stimuli .... [and] then co-
alesces the fragments into a sequence of events which are subjectively logical and accepta-
ble, but may bare only a tenuous relationship to the objective reality of the occurrence
perceived.... Thus, even elimination of the hearsay risk of flawed memory provides scant
assurance that the declarant's perceptual acuity operated at the time in question to produce
anything more than an idiosyncratic image bearing only slight relationship to objective
reality.
Foster, supra note 111, at 328-29; see Marshall, Evidence, Psychology and the Trial: Some Challenges
to Law, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 197, 207-08 (1963); A. TRANKELL, supra note 113, at 18-20.
118. As one commentator has noted, "[E]ven where the contemporaneity requirement is strictly
applied, mere speed, as an aspect of spontaneity, at best renders the veracity of a response more
likely, but not a certitude." Foster, supra note 111, at 326.
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The second rationale, that the declarant has insufficient time to fabricate, is
subject to similar attack. Empirical psychological studies confirm that when
only a matter of a few seconds or fractions of seconds separate the event and
description, the danger of fabrication is decreased. i t9 However, once the
number of seconds has increased even slightly, the reliability of the remarks is
substantially reduced.' 20 The hearsay statement would have to have been spo-
ken virtually simultaneous to the described event for even the slightest assurance
of increased reliability. 121
The application of this second rationale has two problems: first, spontane-
ity is not easily measured after the fact;' 22 and second, courts tend to be very
lenient in the amount of time permitted to pass between the observation and the
contemporaneous or spontaneous statement. 23 Both present sense impressions
and spontaneous exclamations have often been admitted when made several
minutes or even hours after the event described. 124 Thus, if the empirical data is
believed, the interval between event and description typically permitted by
courts renders the reliability of statements admitted under either exception
dubious. 125
119. Foster, supra note 111, at 315; Hutchins & Slesinger, Some Observations on the Law of
Evidence, 28 COLUM. L. REV. 432, 436-37 (1928); Quick, Hearsay, Excitement, Necessity and the
Uniform Rules: A Reappraisal of Rule 63(4), 6 WAYNE L. REV. 204, 210-11 (1960).
120. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119, at 437.
121. Foster, supra note 111, at 315. Even if stopwatch accuracy with respect to the interval
between the event and statement were possible, the courts are not prone to the strict enforcement of
such requirements; see infra note 124.
122. Commentators cite to psychological studies indicating that the interval between cognition
and onset of the capacity to fabricate is brief, often a matter of fractions of seconds, and impossible
to gauge without the aid of instruments. See Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119, at 437; Stewart,
supra note 115, at 8-22.
123. "From the point of view of subjective veracity, the speed the courts demand does not neces-
sarily guarantee truth." Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119, at 439.
124. See United States v. Golden, 671 F.2d 369, 371 (10th Cir.) (excited utterance made 15
minutes after assault held admissible), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 919 (1982); United States v. Blakey, 607
F.2d 779, 786 (7th Cir. 1979) (present sense impression held admissible when spoken within 23
minutes); Hilyer v. Howat Concrete Co., 578 F.2d 422,427 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (excited utterance made
15 to 45 minutes after accident held admissible); McCurdy v. Greyhound Corp., 346 F.2d 224, 226
(3d Cir. 1965) (excited utterance made 15 minutes after accident held admissible); State v. Stafford,
237 Iowa 780, 787, 23 N.W.2d 832, 836 (1946) (excited utterance made 14 hours after beating held
admissible). But see Hamilton v. Missouri Petroleum Products Co., 438 S.W.2d 197, 200 (Mo. 1969)
(excited utterance made 25 minutes after accident held inadmissible); Bowman v. Barnes, 168 W.
Va. 111, 128, 282 S.E.2d 613, 623 (1981) (excited utterance held inadmissible after 44 minutes); see
also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 297, at 856-57 ("[p]erhaps an accurate rule of
thumb might be that where the time interval between the event and the statement is long enough to
permit reflective thought, the statement will be excluded in the absence of some proof that the de-
clarant did not in fact engage in a reflective thought process"); Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119,
at 432-33 (noting that although in one case a statement made over twenty-five minutes after an
accident was held admissible, "[i]n other cases declarations made from a few seconds to fifteen min-
utes after the occurrence has been termed mere narration of past events, and therefore excluded").
125. Stewart notes:
[E]xcitement exaggerates, sometimes grossly, distortion in perception and memory espe-
cially when the observer is a witness to a nonroutine, episodic event such as occurs in
automobile collision cases and crimes. The likelihood of inaccurate perception, the draw-
ing of inferences to fill in memory gaps, and the reporting of nonfacts is high.... Yet in J.
Wigmore's view an excited utterance is such a superior quality of evidence that the declar-
ant need not testify even though available--'a proposition never disputed." In fact, the
theory is merely an artifice for the admission of highly unreliable evidence which is often
HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS AND CONFRONTATION
As noted previously, the exception for spontaneous exclamations rests upon
the same two assumptions regarding spontaneity and reliability that support the
exception for present sense impressions.12 6 Additionally, the trustworthiness of
spontaneous exclamations is said to be bolstered by the fact that the declarant
has uttered the hearsay while in the throes of excitement caused by having wit-
nessed a startling event. Theoretically, the excitement eliminates the witness'
capacity to reflect, thus precluding the ability to fabricate and ensuring an accu-
rate and reliable description of the event perceived.1
2 7
Although strong emotion may negate the power to fabricate, it may also
distort the ability to observe or recall and thereby reduce the trustworthiness of
the declarant's account. "What the emotion gains by way of overcoming the
desire to lie, it loses by impairing the declarant's power of observation."s 2 8 The
more startling the event and the greater the emotional reaction, the less likely
the declarant's observation will be accurate.1
2 9
Thus, contrary to the conclusion of most lower courts that have addressed
the issue,' 3 0 neither the spontaneous exclamation nor present sense impression
exceptions should qualify as firmly rooted. No reasonable assurance exists that
virtually any hearsay admissible under these exceptions has been made under
circumstances that inherently guarantee the absence of either an intentional
fabrication, distortion at the time of the initial observation or an inability to
recall the event as observed.1 3 1 Accordingly, neither exception complies with
the only type of evidence available. No justification exists for foregoing cross-examination
and admitting such evidence if the declarant is available.
Stewart, supra note 115, at 28-29 (footnotes omitted).
126. See supra notes 110-I 1 and accompanying text.
127. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 297, at 855 (in order for the
exception to apply "there must be an occurrence or event sufficiently startling to render inoperative
the normal reflective thought processes); 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, §§ 1747, 1749, at 195, 199
(" 'special trustworthiness' arises from the fact that in the stress of nervous excitement the reflective
faculties may be stilled and the utterance may become the unreflecting and sincere expression of [the
witness'] actual impressions and belief").
128. Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119, at 439. "One need not be a psychologist to distrust
an observation made under emotional stress; everybody accepts such statements with mental reserva-
tion." Id. at 437.
129. Professors Hutchins and Slesinger believed that the existence of this paradox left no justifi-
cation for the exception.
[I]f reflective self-interest has not had a chance to operate because of emotional stress, then
the statement should be excluded because of the probable inaccuracy of observation. On
the other [hand], if little emotion is involved, clearly a very short time is sufficient to allow
reflective self-interest to assume full sway.
Hutchins & Slesinger, supra note 119, at 439. The authors concluded that "[o]n psychological
grounds, the rule might very well read: Hearsay is inadmissible, especially (not except) if it be a
spontaneous exclamation." Id.
Arguably, this danger of inaccuracy or misperception would not be reduced if the declarant
were required to testify to the event observed because the testimony would incorporate the same
perceptual errors that stem from the original observation. Furthermore, if the witness testifies to
what he saw, the danger exists that the witness/declarant's memory may have faded since the event.
Thus, a statement made at the time the event occurred or soon thereafter is arguably just as reliable
as the witness' present testimony. However, this argument misses the point: if the declarant can be
cross-examined, the opportunity of revealing any errors of perception or fabrications is far better
than when the declarant is unavailable for questioning.
130. See cases cited supra notes 101-02.
131. The potential for admitting unreliable spontaneous exclamations or present sense impres-
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the trustworthiness factors delineated in Dutton which require that the out-of-
court statement be based on an accurate recollection of the event and be made
under circumstances that ensure the declarant was not intentionally or uninten-
tionally misrepresenting. 132
B. Adoptive Admissions
The theory of the adoptive admissions exception 13 3 is that when an individ-
ual is confronted with an accusation a reasonable person in like circumstances
would deny, that person's silence may be treated as assent. In other words, the
failure to respond allows the trier of fact to conclude that the listener has
adopted the declarant's assertion as his own. t3 4
Although this assumption may guarantee the reliability of some statements,
courts also recognize that the assumption may not be appropriate in every case,
particularly when viewed in light of the constitutional demands of trustworthi-
ness. 135 Adoptive admissions traditionally have been received with caution; the
sions is illustrated by the fact that the anonymity of the declarant is not a bar to admission under
either exception. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(2). The dangers presented by the admission of a hear-
say statement of an anonymous declarant are described by Weinstein and Berger:
iT~he remarks of a bystander and even of an unidentified bystander are admissible, pro-
vided the requirements of the exception are met.... If the declarant, though a bystander, is
identified, it may be possible to place him at the scene so that a judge could find it reason-
able to infer perception. If he is unidentified, his capacity to observe can neither be sub-
stantiated nor attacked ....
[ihe court's suspicion of the witness' testimony may lead it to find that the declarant's
perception was not established. On the other hand, it may conclude that since the witness
can be cross-examined, the question of his credibility and the derived credibility of the
declarant's statement, are matters which can safely be left to the jury. Much depends on
the type of case, the availability of other evidence, the verifying details in the statement,
and the setting in which the statement is made.
4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 803(1)[01], at 803-77 to -79 (footnote omitted).
132. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
133. The adoptive admission exception to the hearsay rule provides in part: "(d) Statements
which are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-.. .. (2) Admission by party-opponent. The
statement is offered against a party and is . . . (B) a statement of which he has manifested his
adoption or belief in its truth .. " FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(B).
That adoptive admissions are described as nonhearsay by the Federal Rules of Evidence is
merely a theoretical distinction and is of no consequence with respect to any confrontation clause
analysis. Simply because Congress chooses to define certain out-of-court assertions offered to prove
their truth as nonhearsay does not render them immune from attack under the confrontation clause.
134. "Ifa statement is made by another person in the presence of a party to the action, contain-
ing assertions of facts which, if untrue, the party would under all the circumstances naturally be
expected to deny, his failure to speak has traditionally been receivable against him as an admission."
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 270, at 799; see also 4 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1071,
at 102 (Chadbourn rev. 1972) ("[Tlhe inference of assent may safely be made only when no other
explanation is equally consistent with silence; ... unless the circumstances are such that a dissent
would in ordinary experience have been expressed if the communication had not been correct.").
The underlying rationale assumes that "the normal human reaction would be to deny such a state-
ment if untrue." 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, § 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-201.
135. "Despite the offhand appeal of this kind of evidence, the courts have often suggested that it
be received with caution, an admonition that is especially appropriate in criminal cases." MCCOR-
MICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 270, at 800.
According to one court,
The adoptive admission hearsay exclusion does not withstand rigorous constitutional
analysis. Allowing admissions by silence appears to be based on the idea that he who is
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exception is often allowed only if accompanied by restrictions or safeguards that
ensure the offered admission was in fact adopted by the person against whom it
is being admitted. 136 If the defendant against whom the statement is offered did
not adopt it, then the reliability allegedly guaranteed by the exception's rationale
does not arise. Nonetheless, despite the need for individualized examination,
most courts confronted with the issue have found adoptive admissions to be
firmly rooted.' 37
In State v. Marshall,138 for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held
that the adoptive admissions exception is firmly rooted. In a concurring opin-
ion, however, Justice Abrahamson disagreed with the majority's conclusion that
adoptive admissions possess inherent guarantees of trustworthiness. 39 Consis-
tent with the criticism leveled against the exception and the underlying rationale
by other respected commentators, Abrahamson argued that the justification for
the admissibility of such admissions is a "generalization, the truth of which must
be tested in each case." Abrahamson concluded that the reliability of an admis-
sion by silence "'turns on a number of factors including the circumstances in
which the accusation is made, by whom it is made, and the physical and psycho-
logical state of the particular person involved.' "140
silent appears to consent ("qui tacet consentire videtur"). Courts and commentators uni-
formly stress that the legal maxim does not guarantee the reliability of an adoptive admis-
sion consisting of silence.
State v. Marshall, 103 Wis. 2d 643, 659, 335 N.W.2d 612, 619 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., concurring)
(citing Gullickson v. State, 256 Wis. 407, 411, 41 N.W.2d 291, 293 (1950)).
136. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 270, at 800-01; see also 2 JONES, THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE, § 13:49, at 526 (6th ed. 1972 & Supp. 1986) ("[T]estimony [as to defendant's silence)
should be received and applied with caution-especially where the statements have been made, not
by a party to the controversy, but by a stranger thereto.").
137. See cases cited supra note 103.
138. 113 Wis. 2d 643, 335 N.W.2d 612 (1983). The Marshall trial court found that the defend-
ant had adopted the incriminating assertion of one Jackson when Jackson stated, in defendant's
presence, that defendant had agreed to kill someone but had "hit" the wrong person. Id. at 645, 335
N.W.2d at 613. A third party witnessed and testified to the conversation between Jackson and
Marshall. Id. at 647, 335 N.W.2d at 614. The lower court reasoned that "[a) false accusation of a
crime as serious as murder would certainly call for a denial." Id. at 656, 335 N.W.2d at 618. The
majority noted that the adoptive admissions exception had been accepted in that State since the
nineteenth century and was in fact defined as nonhearsay by the Rule 801(d)(2)(B). Id. at 655-56,
335 N.W.2d at 617-18. Peculiarly, the court then inferred that confrontation had been satisfied
because the accused had already had an opportunity to confront his accuser at the time the out-of-
court statement was made. Id. at 656, 335 N.W.2d at 618.
139. Id. at 659, 335 N.W.2d at 619 (Abrahamson, J., concurring). Justice Abrahamson wrote,
Neither adoptive admissions in general nor the testimony in this case meets the standards
of trustworthiness and reliability set forth in Ohio v. Roberts.
This hearsay exception is not "firmly rooted" merely because it is "long established in
Wisconsin." To determine whether an exception is "firmly rooted," the court should de-
termine whether the hearsay exception guarantees that the evidence admitted is trustwor-
thy and reliable to the degree necessary to satisfy the requirements of the confrontation
clause.
Id. at 658, 335 N.W.2d at 619 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (citing State v. Bauer, 109 Wis. 2d 204,
213, 325 N.W.2d 857, 862 (1982); State v. Dorsey, 103 Wis. 2d 152, 170, 307 N.W.2d 612, 621
(1981) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)). But see State v. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d 681, 709-10, 370 N.W.2d
745, 759 (1985), discussed supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
140. Id. at 659, 335 N.W.2d at 619 (Abrahamson, J., concurring) (quoting 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 801(d)(2)(B)[01], at 801-201 to -203).
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Abrahamson was clearly correct in concluding that, before an adoptive ad-
mission can be used against a criminal defendant, the presence of these reliabil-
ity-ensuring "factors" must be assured. Absent these guarantees of
trustworthiness, such statements should not be admissible. Not all adoptive ad-
missions exceptions, however, explicitly demand the existence of factors beyond
the requirement that the accusation against the defendant be made in his pres-
ence.1 41 Under these statutes, if a court fails to require the presence of factors
ensuring reliability, compliance with the exception may result in the admission
of unreliable statements. This exception illustrates the rare instance which the
fourth Dutton factor requiring personal knowledge on the part of the declarant
may not be satisfied.1 42 In other words, no reasonable assurance exists that the
listener remained silent because he agreed with the accusation against him. Be-
cause personal knowledge by the declarant is not guaranteed, the accuracy of
the statement is substantially in doubt. Thus, in the absence of individualized
evaluation, none of the Dutton factors for determining reliability can be said to
exist with respect to virtually any statement offered under this exception. Be-
cause of the need for additional guarantees of trustworthiness, the burden of
establishing the unreliability of an adoptive admission should not be placed on
the opponent of the evidence. A presumption of constitutionality in favor of
every adoptive admission is no more warranted than it is for present sense im-
pressions or spontaneous exclamations.
C. Declarations Against Penal Interest
The underlying rationale of the declaration against penal interest excep-
tion143 rests on the assumption that no reasonable individual would knowingly
say something against her own interest unless convinced of its truth.' 44 Ini-
141. See supra note 134.
142. For a discussion of the Dutton factors, see notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
143. The Federal Rules of Evidence define statements against penal interest as follows:
(b) Hearsay exceptions. The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule if the
declarant is unavailable as a witness:
(3) Statement against interest. A statement which was at the time of its making so
far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary or proprietary interest, or so far tended to subject
him to civil or criminal liability, or to render invalid a claim by him against another, that a
reasonable man in his position would not have made the statement unless he believed it to
be true. A statement tending to expose the declarant to criminal liability and offered to
exculpate the accused is not admissible unless corroborating circumstances clearly indicate
the trustworthiness of the statement.
FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3).
144. "The basis of the exception is the principle of experience that a statement asserting a fact
distinctly against one's interest is unlikely to be deliberately false or heedlessly incorrect, and is thus
sufficiently sanctioned, though oath and cross-examination are wanting .. " 5 J. WIGMORr, supra
note 2, § 1457, at 329. Other commentators concur in this rationale:
When a declarant has made a disserving statement, it is reasonable to presume that he or
she was under the influence of a truth-telling stimulus strong enough to overcome the fear
of criminal liability. The potential for reckless or intentional misstatement is greater when
the facts stated are either self-serving or neutral.
Note, Declarations Against Penal Interest: Standards of Admissibility Under An Emerging Majority
Rule, 56 B.U.L. REv. 148, 154 (1976); see also People v. Spriggs, 60 Cal. 2d 868, 874, 389 P.2d 377,
381, 36 Cal. Rptr. 841, 845 (1964) (declarations against penal interest "give[s] reasonable assurance
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tially, this rationale was accepted with respect to admission of hearsay declara-
tions against pecuniary and proprietary interests, and later was expanded to
include civil liability. 14 5 Only in the past two decades have a significant number
of jurisdictions broadened the exception to include declarations against penal
interest,' 4 6 an expansion that has increased the potential danger the hearsay
might be unreliable.1 47 Although many declarations against penal interest ar-
of the veracity of his statement made against that interest"); Jefferson, Declarations Against Interest:
An Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 58 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17-29, 43-63 (1944) (discussing trustworthi-
ness of statements against interest and the time when the declaration must be against the party's
interest).
Furthermore, one court has noted:
With respect to inculpatory declarations against interest,... admission is proper only
when it is demonstrated that "corroborating circumstances clearly indicate the trustwor-
thiness of the statement." . . . [Tihe statement is receivable only if (1) the declarant is
unavailable as a witness; (2) the statement is so far contrary to the declarant's pecuniary,
proprietary, or penal interest that a reasonable person in his position would not have made
the statement unless he believed it to be true; and (3) the trustworthiness of the statement is
corroborated by the attendant circumstances.
United States v. Palumbo, 639 F.2d 123, 131 (3d Cir.), (quoting FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3)) cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 819 (1981).
145. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 277, at 821-22.
146. See 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[04], at 804-157 to -163; Mc-
CORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 278, at 822-24.
147. "The inclusion of statements against penal interest in the exception for statements against
interest raises a host of intertwined constitutional and evidentiary problems .... 4 J. WEINSTEIN
& M. BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-139.
The exception for statements against interest... rests on the assumption that persons
will not make damaging statements against themselves unless they are true. As a psycho-
logical generalization, this conclusion rings true; in the individual case, the diversity of the
human personality makes generalizations suspect. Persons will lie despite the conse-
quences to themselves to exculpate those they love or fear, to inculpate those they hate or
fear, or because they are congenital liars. Others will not realize that they are making an
admission against themselves, or will make ambivalent statements susceptible of differing
interpretations.
Id. 804(b)(3)[01], at 804-123; see also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 279, at 824-27
(elaborating on the following factors to be considered when determining whether a statement is
against interest: the time the statement was made; the nature of the statement; what outside facts
existed when the statement was made; and the actual state of mind of the declarant). Another
commentator has noted that "[c]ross-examination of the individual declarant focuses attention on
his quirks and idiosyncrasies. Ifa declarant's statement against penal interest is admitted as hearsay,
thus sacrificing cross-examination for the sake of practicality, the possibility that an innocent de-
fendant can be convicted on the basis of an unreasonable declarant's statement increases." Com-
ment, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 159, 163 (1983).
In fact, some lower courts have permitted the prosecution to use declarations against penal
interest when made under circumstances of questionable reliability. See, e.g., Olson v. Green, 668
F.2d 421 (8th Cir.) (although ultimately held to be harmless error, accomplice's custodial statements
made after extensive police questioning, admitted by the trial court as declarations against penal
interest, did not bear sufficient indicia of reliability), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1009 (1982); United
States v. Alvarez, 584 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1978) (defendant's conviction reversed on Fifth Circuit's
finding that the statement of a now-deceased declarant, although contrary to his penal interest, was
not sufficiently trustworthy to be used against defendant; the prosecution witness who testified to the
declarant's remarks was also implicated in the criminal activity and hoped to receive preferential
treatment; the argument that the statement was against the declarant's interest was weak and the
statements lacked corroboration); People v. Lee, 129 Ill. App. 3d 1167, 491 N.W.2d 1391, appeal
denied, No. 5-82-0539 (March 1984), rev'd sub nom, Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986) (United
States Supreme Court held that the trial court had improperly relied on a codefendant's confession
given to the police as violative of defendant's right to confrontation; codefendant's confession, made
only after he was told defendant had implicated him and that the defendant had implored him to
share "the rap" with her, gave a substantially different version of how the crimes came to be commit-
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guably may possess indicia of reliability and have been classified as firmly rooted
by some lower courts,1 48 the trustworthiness of the typical declaration offered
against criminal defendants is questionable.
The exception for declarations against penal interest is used against crimi-
nal defendants when, though spoken by a third party declarant, the statements
nonetheless tend to incriminate the accused as well as the deelarant. 149
Although the statement may incriminate the declarant, he may have lied in
hopes of transferring some of the blame to the nondeclarant defendant. 150
When declarations specifically inculpating a nondeclarant are offered against
that nondeclarant, the exception's rationale for ensuring reliability no longer ap-
plies. 151 Therefore, the declaration should not fall within this hearsay excep-
tion. There is a danger some courts might admit such statements under this
exception. In fact, some courts have admitted these declarations under either an
ted). See infra notes 155-65 and accompanying text for a further discussion of Lee and the potential
dangers of admitting declarations against penal interest as an exception to the hearsay rule.
The potential danger of untrustworthiness with respect to declarations against penal interest
theoretically applies to statements offered by either the prosecution or the defense. Either could
submit a third party's declaration, even though it may have been spoken in circumstances of ques-
tionable reliability. A defendant, for example, could arrange for another person to confess falsely to
the crime for which the defendant is accused. To prevent this from occurring, the Federal Rules of
Evidence have provided that declarations against penal interest cannot be used to exculpate an ac-
cused unless made under trustworthy circumstances. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3). This places the
burden of establishing the trustworthiness of the statement on the accused, the party on whose behalf
the hearsay is offered. No corresponding requirement of trustworthiness appears in the Federal
Rules as a prerequisite to the prosecution's use of hearsay under this exception. See MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 252, at 749. Presumably, no statutory requirement of trustworthiness
is necessary because the confrontation clause already provides defendants with a guarantee that the
hearsay will be used against them only if it was made under reliable circumstances.
148. See cases cited supra note 104.
149. Declarations against penal interest are not uttered by a defendant, because any prior state-
ment made by a defendant is admissible against him as a party admission. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2)(A).
150. Although some courts have correctly distinguished between declarations which merely in-
criminate the declarant and those which inculpate a third party as well, other courts have admitted
these declarations against nondeclarant defendants:
The true danger inherent in this type of hearsay is, in fact, its selective reliability. As we
have consistently recognized, a codefendant's confession is presumptively unreliable as to
the passages detailing the defendant's conduct or culpability because those passages may
well be the product of the codefendant's desire to shift or spread blame, curry favor, avenge
himself, or divert attention to another.
Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056, 2064 (1986); see also Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 79 (1979)(Blackmun, J., concurring) (even though codefendants had confessed and their confessions over-
lapped, the court should weigh all the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement before
deciding whether admission of the statemate was harmless error). These statements should be ad-
missible only after an examination of the actual circumstances surrounding the making of the state-
ment reveals particularized guarantees of trustworthiness. United States v. Katsougrakis, 715 F.2d
769, 775 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1040 (1984); People v. Moore, 693 P.2d 388, 390
(Colo. Ct. App. 1984).
151. A commentator has noted:
[M]ost statements inculpating a defendant are only collateral to the portion of the declar-
ant's statement that is against his own penal interest. The portion of the statement that
specifically implicates the defendant is rarely directly counter to the declarant's penal inter-
est. This further weakens the contention that statements against penal interest are
trustworthy.
Comment, supra note 147, at 163.
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expanding hearsay exception 152 or the exception for statements of a cocon-
spirator. 153 Because the motive to falsify is substantial, the statement may fail to
comply with the third Dutton factor because it may contain a misrepresentation
of fact. This danger undercuts the reliability of declarations against penal inter-
est with respect to both prearrest and postarrest statements that incriminate
both the declarant and a third-party defendant.
When the declaration is made in the questionable atmosphere of postarrest
interrogation, the already pervasive potential for untrustworthiness is exacer-
bated. 15 4 In Lee v. Illinois 15 - the United States Supreme Court expressed con-
siderable concern over the use of postarrest declarations against a nondeclarant
defendant. Lee's murder conviction rested in part on a confession given to the
police by her codefendant.1 56 That confession implicated both the declarant and
Lee. In reversing defendant's conviction, the five-to-four majority noted that
"'the post-arrest statements of a codefendant have traditionally been viewed
with special suspicion. Due to his strong motivation to implicate the defendant
and to exonerate himself, a codefendant's statements about what the defendant
said or did are less credible than ordinary hearsay evidence.'- 157
152. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
153. See infra notes 166-83 and accompanying text for a discussion of the coconspirator
exception.
154. See United States v. Riley, 657 F.2d 1377, 1384 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. I 1111(1983); United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1025 (8th Cir. 1979); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advi-
sory committee notes; MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 279, at 826; J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, supra note 2, 804(b)(3)[03], at 804-150 to -157.
For example, a declarant who is in custody while making his statement may very well
desire to curry favor with the authorities by implicating another, whether or not leniency
has been expressly promised. Other motives to falsify may be present even where there is
no fear of reprisal for admitting a crime: the desire to share blame with another; the wish
for revenge; the hope for diverting attention from oneself; and even publicity-seeking or
simple lying.
Comment, supra note 147, at 163-64. This concern for the reliability of such a statement was reiter-
ated by the United States Supreme Court in Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986), in which Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that the "truthfinding function of the Confrontation Clause
is uniquely threatened when an accomplice's confession is sought to be introduced against a criminal
defendant without benefit of cross-examination." Id. at 2062 (citing Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissenting)).
155. 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
156. Id. at 2061. Lee had also confessed to the police and, although the two confessions were in
part consistent, codefendant Thomas' confession provided a very different version of how the two
had committed the murders. Id. at 2059. The most significant difference was that Thomas claimed
he and Lee had previously discussed the possibility of killing one of the eventual victims and that
they had referred to this earlier conversation "immediately prior to the murders." Id. at 2060-61.
This suggested the killings may have been premeditated. Id. at 2059. On the other hand, Lee's
confession implied that she and Thomas had never planned or discussed the possibility of killing the
victims. She had suggested that her co-defendant Thomas had "snapped" the night of the murders
and that he was to blame for the killings. Id. at 2062.
157. Id. at 2062 (quoting Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 141 (1968) (White, J., dissent-
ing)). Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, noted that this case was not a case like Bruton, in
which the Court was "concerned with the effectiveness of limiting instructions in preventing spill-
over prejudice to a defendant when his codefendant's confession is admitted against the codefendant
at ajoint trial. Rather, this case is strikingly similar to [Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965)]."
Id. at 2063.
At Douglas' trial for assault with intent to murder, his alleged accomplice was called as a
prosecution witness. Invoking the privilege against self-incrimination, the witness refused to testify.
Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416 (1965). The prosecution, in a dubious attempt to allegedly
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The majority opinion in Lee, harkening back to Roberts, 15 8 cautioned that
if a hearsay statement does not fall within a firmly rooted exception, it can sat-
isfy the requirements of the confrontation clause only if it is "marked with such
trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason of the [con-
frontation clause's] general rule.' "159 The Court did not decide whether the
declaration against penal interest exception was firmly rooted. Rather, the
Court held that under the facts of this case, the statement did not fall within a
firmly rooted exception, and thus the proponent bore the burden of establishing
that the statement was spoken in circumstances of "particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness."1 60
The Court in Lee agreed with the lower state court 16' that, given sufficient
"indicia of reliability," this presumption of untrustworthiness could have been
rebutted in the present case. 162 The majority concluded, however, that the
lower court had erred in finding that the circumstances surrounding the confes-
sion in this case were sufficiently reliable to rebut this presumption. 163 "[O]nce
partners in a crime recognize that the 'jig is up' they tend to lose any identity of
interest and immediately become antagonists, rather than accomplices."' 64
Based on the record before it, the Court found no reason "to depart from the
time honored teaching that a codefendant's confession inculpating the accused is
inherently unreliable, and that convictions supported by such evidence violate
the constitutional right of confrontation."' 165
"refresh" the witness' memory, read the witness' prior confession to him in the presence of the jury.
The witness, however, remained recalcitrant and refused to answer any questions on either direct or
cross-examination. Id. at 416-17. The Douglas Court held that the inability to cross-examine a
witness whose incriminating confession had been read to the jury denied the accused his right of
cross-examination and as a result was too unreliable to be constitutionally admitted. Id. at 419.
"This holding ... was premised on the basic understanding that when one person accuses another of
a crime under circumstances in which the declarant stands to gain by implicating another, the accu-
sation is presumptively suspect and must be subjected to the scrutiny of cross-examination." Lee,
106 S. Ct. at 2062-63.
158. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 56 (1980).
159. Lee, 106 S. Ct. at 2064 (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65). The Court thus reaffirmed what it
had established in Roberts: "even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within a 'firmly rooted
hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause
purposes, it may nonetheless meet the Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by
a 'showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.'" Id. at 2063-64 (quoting Roberts, 448
U.S. at 66).
With respect to the facts of Lee, Justice Brennan concluded that the circumstances surrounding
the confession did not rebut its presumptively unreliable and inadmissible character. Id. at 2064. In
support, the Court noted:
When Thomas was taken in for questioning and read his rights he refused to talk to the
police. The confession was elicited only after Thomas was told that Lee had already impli-
cated him and only after he was implored by Lee to share "the rap" with her. The un-
sworn statement was given in response to the questions of police, who, having already
interrogated Lee, no doubt knew what they were looking for, and the statement was not
tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel, or its equivalent.
Id. at 2064.
160. Id.
161. The Illinois Supreme Court denied hearing on the matter. Id. at 2061.
162. Id. at 2063.
163. Id. at 2064.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2065.
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Although the Supreme Court has thus eliminated some of the danger asso-
ciated with the use of postarrest declarations against penal interest offered
against nondeclarant defendants, it has not yet similarly restricted the use of
such prearrest declarations. This latter category of statements, though they may
not have all the dangers of untrustworthiness associated with postarrest declara-
tions, nonetheless possess only limited indicia of reliability. In the absence of
either an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant or unusually trustworthy
circumstances, the out-of-court confession of an alleged accomplice, whether
made in a prearrest or postarrest setting, should not be admissible against an
accused.
D. The Coconspirator Exception
Many incriminating statements attributed to an alleged coconspirator 166
can be used against all other alleged members of the conspiracy. The problems
surrounding the admission of declarations against penal interest offered against
nondeclarant defendants are similar to and overlap those respecting some state-
ments admitted under the coconspirator exception. 167
Lower courts have divided over the question of whether the hearsay excep-
tion for statements of a coconspirator should be classified as firmly rooted.
Although several courts have held the exception to be firmly rooted, 168 other
courts have reached the opposite conclusion, reasoning that hearsay statements
falling within this exception are admitted as a result of factors having nothing to
do with any claim of trustworthiness.1 69 Rather, these statements gain admis-
166. The hearsay exception for statements of a coconspirator provides: "(d) Statements which
are not hearsay. A statement is not hearsay if-... . (2) Admission by party-opponent. The state-
ment is offered against a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." FED.R.EvlD. 801(d)(2)(E). The Federal Rules of
Evidence define the statements of co-conspirators, as well as party admissions, as nonhearsay rather
than hearsay admissible under an exception. The exclusion for both of these exceptions is justified
by their substantially similar underlying rationale.
167. Normally for a statement to be admissible under the coconspirator exception, it must be
made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy; therefore, most hearsay admissible
as a statement of a coconspirator is made in prearrest settings. However, the Supreme Court has
affirmed the prosecution's use of postarrest statements of a coconspirator as not inconsistent with the
requirements of the confrontation clause. See Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89.
168. See cases cited supra note 105; see also Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Cocon-
spirator Exemption From the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment,
85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1299 & nn.36-38 (1985) [hereinafter Reconciling] (discussing how circuit
courts have analyzed the reliability of coconspirator statements, and citing opinions that hold that
coconspirator statements are inherently unreliable as well as opinions that hold that coconspirator
statements are inherently reliable); Note, Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) and the Confronta-
tion Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator Hearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV.
1291, 1310 n.122 (1985) [hereinafter Closing the Window] (list of cases in which courts have dis-
missed confrontation challenges only on the grounds that the coconspirator exception was firmly
rooted).
169. Although the coconspirator exception may be "firmly established" in the United States'
rules of evidence, "its origins nevertheless were distinct from those of most exceptions." Reconciling,
supra note 168, at 1307-08. According to another commentator:
When measuring the reliability of coconspirator statements in terms of sincerity, ambigu-
ity, perception and memory, it becomes obvious that the coconspirator statement is not
"firmly rooted." Because they have a special incentive to shift blame to one another, co-
conspirators are likely to bend the truth of their statements. They are also likely to speak
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sion as a result of a combination of estoppel and agency rationales that bears no
relation to the statement's inherent reliability. 170
In United States v. Inadi1 7 1 the Supreme Court commented that
"[c]onspirators are likely to speak differently when talking to each other.
in code words or names that make the identification of their meaning or subject matter
ambiguous.
Closing the Window, supra note 168, at 1311. For cases analyzing the indicia of reliability of cocon-
spirators' statements, see id. at 1315-16 nn. 153 & 154.
170. Justice Marshall has stated:
Under the agency theory that supports conspiracy law, 'once the conspiracy or combina-
tion is established, the act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the enterprise, is consid-
ered the act of all, and is evidence against all.' Every statement made by co-conspirators in
furtherance of their illegal scheme is thus a verbal act admissible against each conspirator
as if it had been his own.
United States v. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. 1121, 1132 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting United States
v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469 (1827)); see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2,
§ 267, at 792; 4 J. WIGMORE, supra note 134, § 1079, at 180; Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A
Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators' Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159,
1165-66 (1954).
Holding that the exception for statements of coconspirators is not firmly rooted, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the estoppel rationale. The court
noted that, like party admissions, the statements of a coconspirator are "not admitted because of
confidence in their inherent reliability; rather, they are admitted because 'a party will not be heard to
object that she is unworthy of credence.'" United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir.
1984), (quoting United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936
(1983)) cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115 (1985). However, because the assertions of alleged coconspira-
tors are being offered against nondeclarant defendants, some form of analysis based on vicarious
liability or alter-ego is a necessary prerequisite to the application of the estoppel rationale. See State
v. Canaday, 684 P.2d 912 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). The missing analytical link is provided by a classic
legal fiction under which coconspirators, as partners in crime, are said to be authorized to speak on
behalf of one another. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 267, at 792; 4 J. WIGMORE,
supra note 134, § 1079, at 180. One court has noted:
Such declarations are admitted upon no doctrine of the law of evidence, but of the substan-
tive law of crime. When men enter into an agreement for an unlawful end, they become ad
hoc agents for one another, and have made "a partnership in crime." What one does
pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and, as declarations may be such acts, they are
competent against all.
Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (2d Cir. 1926). Therefore, everything said by a co-
conspirator in furtherance of and during the course of the conspiracy is admissible against any
conspirator. This rationale is, of course, fictitious; very few coconspirators are actually authorized to
speak on behalf of each other. Thus, this exception arises out of principles of criminal and agency
law that are not inherently reliable. See Reconciling, supra note 168, at 1314-16.
171. 106 S. Ct. 1121 (1986). The lower court in Inadi determined that the admission of a co-
conspirator's statements violated the defendant's sixth amendment rights because the government
had not established that declarant was unavailable to testify. Id. at 1124-25 n.3. Despite language
to the contrary in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that unavailability is
not a constitutional prerequisite to the prosecution's use of the coconspirator exception. Inadi 106
S. Ct. at 1129.
The Court acknowledged that this was opposite to what it had traditionally demanded as a pre-
condition to the admission of hearsay under the former testimony exception. The Court noted,
however, that former testimony is not admitted because it has any independent evidentiary signifi-
cance of its own. Rather, "if the declarant is unavailable, no 'better' version of the evidence exists,
and the former testimony may be admitted as a substitute for the live testimony on the same point."
Id. at 1126. This analysis is somewhat inconsistent with the Court's opinion in Mancusi v. Stubbs,
408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972), in which Justice Rehnquist noted that it was clear "from numerous prior
decisions of this Court, that even though the witness be unavailable his prior testimony must bear
some of the 'indicia of reliability' referred to in Dutton."
Justice Powell, writing for the majority in Inadi, commented that although "former testimony
often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony," the statements of a coconspirator gain trustwor-
thiness from the circumstances in which they are made. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126.
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than when testifying on the witness stand. Even when the declarant takes the
stand, his in-court testimony seldom will reproduce a significant portion of the
evidentiary value of his statements during the course of the conspiracy." 172
Thus, the Court strongly implied that the out-of-court statements of a cocon-
spirator were likely to be more trustworthy than his testimony at trial.
In response to the majority's suggestion that coconspirator hearsay is trust-
worthy, Justice Marshall in his dissent argued that the roots of this exception do
not lie in any claim of special reliability. 173 Rather, as noted above, he found
that the exception was born of a questionable authorization parentage.1 7 4 "This
agency theory, which even the Advisory Committee on the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence labeled 'at best a fiction,' . . .might justify the exemption
conferred upon co-conspirator declarations from the traditional rule against
hearsay. But it speaks not at all to the Confrontation Clause's concern for relia-
ble factfinding."' 7 5
The Court in Inadi did not decide whether the exception for statements of a
coconspirator should be classified as firmly rooted.'7 6 By suggesting that these
statements are made under trustworthy circumstances that cannot be duplicated
at trial, however, the decision pointed the way to the exception's classification as
firmly rooted. 177
In Bourjaily v. United States 178 the Court answered the question left un-
resolved in Inadi. The majority held that the statements of a coconspirator
made during the furtherance of a conspiracy are firmly rooted.' 7 9 Justice Rehn-
172. hIadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1126.
173. Id. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
175. Inadi, 106 S. Ct. at 1132 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
176. Justice Marshall's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, was clearly correct in stating that the
Court's "decision does nothing to resolve the conflict among the lower courts as to whether declara-
tions of coconspirators who are not present in court for cross-examination must be shown to have
particularized 'indicia of reliability' before they can be admitted for substantive purposes against a
criminal defendant." Id. at 1129 n.1. "With respect to the case before us, the majority takes but a
small step .... Respondent is ... free to return to the Court of Appeals and argue that the co-
conspirator declarations admitted against him lack the 'indicia of reliability' demanded by the Con-
frontation Clause." Id. at 1129.
177. The four Dutton factors were created by the plurality in that case to enable the court to
determine whether a statement offered under the Georgia coconspirator exception satisfied the de-
mands of the confrontation clause. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89 (1970); see supra notes 53-58 and
accompanying text.
178. 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
179. Id. at 2783. The three-vote dissent in Bourjaily was written by Justice Blackmun, who had
authored the majority opinions in Roberts and Inadi, and was signed by Justices Marshall and Bren-
nan, who had dissented in Inadi. The dissent found the majority's conclusion "astounding," id. at
2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), particularly in light of the majority opinion's also having eliminated
the rule against "bootstrapping." Id. at 2791 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 2780-81. This
rule previously had required that only evidence independent of the statement itself could be used to
preliminarily establish the existence of a conspiracy. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) permits this
circular reasoning, but had never before been applied to Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which had codified the
common law on the admission of coconspirator statements.
The majority held that the preliminary requirement of proof of a conspiracy, which has to be
established before the out-of-court statement could be admitted under this exception, could be satis-
fied by first accepting the statement as true. Id. at 2790 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 2780-
81. In other words, when deciding whether the statement satisfies the exception's foundational re-
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quist did not, however, find it necessary to credit this exception with inherent
reliability. Rather, he concluded simply that coconspirators' statements "have a
long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion."180
He found this tradition sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause, without the
need "to embark on an independent inquiry into the reliability of the statements
. "... 181 This analysis suggests that the majority of the Court may not be as
concerned with the reliability of statements offered under firmly rooted excep-
tions as it is with the longevity of those exceptions.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the dissent, was concerned with the lack of
inherent reliability in many statements offered under the coconspirator excep-
tion. He commented that "unlike many common-law hearsay exceptions, the
coconspirator exemption from hearsay with its agency rationale was not based
primarily upon any particular guarantees of reliability .... -182
This exception should not be classified as firmly rooted. A finding of trust-
worthiness sufficient to satisfy the confrontation clause should not be based on
the unsupported assumption that virtually any out-of-court statement uttered
by an alleged coconspirator is more reliable than his in-court testimony. A
statement falling under this exception should be excluded unless sufficient evi-
dence shows it was based on the declarant's personal knowledge and is not the
product of faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional misrepresentation.
Absent such a finding, the admission of statements offered under the co-conspir-
ator exception should be held to violate the Supreme Court's standard for satis-
fying the demands of confrontation as expressed in Roberts and Dutton.1 83
quirement that a conspiracy existed, trial courts can rely, at least in part, on their belief in the truth
of the statement. Id. at 2783-84 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Thus, in one breath, the majority labeled this exception as firmly rooted while eliminating a
long-standing reliability safeguard. The majority enigmatically concluded that abolishing the rule
against bootstrapping did not affect the firmly rooted status of the exception because "[t]he boot-
strapping rule relates only to the method of proof that the exception has been satisfied. It does not
change any element of the coconspirator exception, which has remained substantively unchanged
since its adoption in this country." Id. at 2783 n.4.
The dissent countered that the majority was attempting to "have it both ways: it cannot trans-
form the exemption, as it admittedly does, and then avoid Confrontation Clause concerns by conjur-
ing up the firmly rooted hearsay exception as some benign genie who will extricate the Court from its
inconsistent analysis." Id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
180. Id. at 2783.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 42-58. In this context, an additional noteworthy excep-
tion that has been held to be firmly rooted by a lower court is that for statements made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment. FED. R. EVID. 803(4). Though this exception is not as likely to
arise in as many criminal cases as the other exceptions discussed in this Article, it is coinceivable that
it might be employed by the prosecution. Because at least one lower court has classified it as firmly
rooted some discussion is justified. Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 710, 370 N.W.2d at 759. A patient suffer-
ing from a malady seeks the advice of a physician to make her well again, and thus is strongly
motivated to be truthful to obtain the appropriate care. See Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 710, 370 N.W.2d
at 759. Patients are unlikely to be untruthful to a treating physician; to do so could result in mis-
diagnosis and erroneous treatment. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 2, § 292, at 839; see
generally 6 J. WIGMORE, supra note 108, §§ 1719-1720, at 103-13 (statements to a physician may be
admitted into evidence if they are spontaneous and natural expressions of pain or suffering; most
jurisdictions admit only statements of present pain and exclude statements of past condition and
symptoms). This principle provides the basis for the exception for statements made by a patient for
purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Accepting the accuracy of this rationale, courts have
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VI. "FIRMLY ROOTED" REVISITED
Obviously, at some point a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation
may be somewhat limited by substantial, though countervailing, benefits to the
efficient administration of criminal justice. To a limited extent this balancing
allows for the use of exceptions to the hearsay rule to the detriment of criminal
defendants. The creation of a formula for reconciling the confrontation clause
and the exceptions to the hearsay rule is appealing when compared to case-by-
case analysis. Unfortunately, the "firmly rooted" formula does not effectively
promote administrative efficiency enough to justify placing the burden of estab-
lishing untrustworthiness upon the accused.
The advantages of establishing such a formula would presumably include
ease and consistency of application, time saved at both the trial and appellate
levels in reaching decisions on the correctness of admitting hearsay, as well as
held that, absent unusual circumstances, statements made by a patient to a treating physician are
"clearly grounded on considerations of reliability and trustworthiness." Wyss, 124 Wis. 2d at 710,
370 N.W.2d at 759; see also Goldstein v. Sklar, 216 A.2d 298, 305 (Me. 1966) (statements made by a
patient to an examining physician "are viewed as highly reliable and apt to state true facts").
The indicia of reliability allegedly provided by this exception's underlying rationale is, however,
more problematic than the comments in the preceding paragraph would suggest. While it may often
be in the patient's best interest to be truthful with his or her physician, this is not a realistic assess-
ment of all doctor-patient communications. For example:
Reliance on the patient's desire for effective treatment as the basis for the hearsay
exception does not limit the physician to only those symptoms which bothered the patient
at the time the statement was made. The patient's complaint of prior pain and suffering
may also be admissible since both present and past pain could form the basis for diagnosis
and treatment.
Much more difficult to deal with is the patient claiming only past pain and no present
symptoms. If the patient claims to seek a tardy treatment for past ailments in fear that
they may re-occur, his statements should be no less admissible, although perhaps more
suspect.
Theis, The Doctor as Witness: Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, 10 Loy.
U. CHi. L.J. 363, 366 (1979). Because the statement is often submitted on the patient's behalf in
litigation, the chances that the statement might inaccurately reflect the actual medical condition is
greater than in the typical doctor-patient consultation. Theis continues,
The rule assumes a patient who suffers genuine illness. More importantly, it assumes
the patient has minimal ability to reject the advised course of treatment. If the patient
suffers from no illness at all, however, he may either reject the treatment, sometimes with-
out informing his physician, or may follow the treatment, as long as he has a reasonable
expectation that the treatment will have no deleterious effects. For example, a patient
complaining of "whiplash" has little to lose by so representing to his doctor. If the doctor
prescribes pain-killers and a cervical collar, the patient might easily disregard the treat-
ment without ever informing his doctor. He might choose to follow the treatment with
little danger to his actual good health.
It is impossible to determine which stereotype is predominant: the patient who makes
truthful disclosure for fear that his health will be further endangered if he misleads his
doctor or the patient who manufactures symptoms, secure that he can do himself no harm.
The law has assumed the honest patient in accepting these statements for the truth of the
matter asserted.
Theis, supra, at 365.
Thus, as is true for other exceptions discussed in this Article, this exception fails to comply with
the third Dutton factor. See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. Statements falling within
this hearsay exception may be spoken in circumstances that would result in misrepresentation. As
with many other exceptions that suffer from similar failings, this potential untrustworthiness is not
great enough to mandate repeal of the entire exception. However, it is sufficiently significant to cast
doubt on this exception's classification as firmly rooted.
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the certainty with which litigants could predict evidentiary rulings. If all hear-
say falling within firmly rooted exceptions were conclusively constitutional, then
substantial judicial efficiency would result. Not only would there be ease, pre-
dictability, and consistency of application, but substantial court time would also
be saved by eliminating the need to hear evidence on a case-by-case basis.
Not all statements admissible under a particular hearsay exception, how-
ever, possess the same degree of trustworthiness and reliability.1 84 A conclusive
presumption would foreclose a defendant from meritoriously arguing a violation
of his constitutional rights by prohibiting him from demonstrating the untrust-
worthiness of the particular hearsay offered by the prosecution. 185 Such a result
would be constitutionally intolerable, because it undercuts the essential charac-
ter of the confrontation clause. 186 This sacrifice is too great to justify on the
grounds of judicial efficiency.
But courts should not, and most do not, employ the "firmly rooted"
formula in this conclusive manner. Statements offered under firmly rooted ex-
ceptions are customarily inadmissible only if the accused is able to establish that
they were uttered in untrustworthy circumstances. In other words, courts are
still required to consume time in determining whether the particular hearsay
offered was made under unreliable circumstances. It cannot be said that the
"firmly rooted" formula is a substantial improvement in terms of the ease, pre-
dictability, consistency of application, or time consumption that would exist if
the constitutionality of each hearsay statement were considered on a case-by-
case basis. Rather, courts are still required to engage in a case-by- case analysis,
with all the consequential uncertainty and time consumption. Thus, unless we
adopt a constitutionally intolerable conclusive presumption, the "firmly rooted"
formula benefits little, if at all, the goal of improving the efficiency of judicial
administration.
Although the rebuttable presumption created by the "firmly rooted"
formula may not be as potentially damaging to the constitutional rights of de-
fendants as a conclusive presumption, it still may unnecessarily increase and
dangerously limit a defendant's constitutional right to confrontation. Although
hearsay exceptions suffer from a variety of problems, a common thread runs
throughout this discussion. All of these exceptions, other than the exception for
previously cross-examined former testimony, are generally rationalized by an
184. For example, two statements admissible under the same exception can boast substantially
different levels of trustworthiness depending on the self-serving nature of their content. Assume a
jurisdiction labels as "firmly rooted" spontaneous exclamations. A spontaneous exclamation which
is favorable to the interests of the declarant made moments after an automobile accident, may not
possess the same degree of reliability as an exclamation acknowledging the declarant's own liability.
Similarly, it is arguable that given the rationale underlying the exception, the dying declaration of
one who is devoutly religious may be more reliable than that of an atheist who does not fear the
consequences of dying with a lie on his lips.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 32-41.
186. As in Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969), constitutional rights may be violated even if
the presumption merely places the burden of producing evidence on the accused. However, if the
presumption of constitutional admissibility is rebuttable, then the accused would at least have the
opportunity to demonstrate that the particular hearsay submitted by the prosecution is so unreliable
as to deny the right to confrontation. For a discussion of Leary, see supra note 41.
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unrealistic evaluation of the safeguards that supposedly ensure the statements'
reliability. Their continued existence is more a consequence of long-established
tradition than of compelling logic.
Once courts label an exception as firmly rooted, the burden shifts to the
accused to establish the untrustworthiness of hearsay falling within that excep-
tion. Logically, the party on whom the burden rests will be less likely to over-
come that burden. For example, if a trial judge concludes that the evidence
from both the prosecution and defendant as to whether the hearsay statement is
reliable lies in equipoise, then a decision against the party with the burden is
mandated.' 87 The practical significance of having to overcome such a burden
typically arises in two situations. One is when versions of the circumstances
surrounding the making of the out-of-court statement conflict. The other is
when no evidence exists at all regarding the indicia of reliability of the hearsay
statement, as when the hearsay was spoken by an anonymous declarant and is
offered under an exception, such as that for spontaneous exclamations. In such
a situation, nothing may be known about the declarant or the circumstances
under which his statement was uttered, except that a trial witness now recounts
having heard the out-of-court statement.
In both situations, the fact that a hearsay statement is presumptively relia-
ble and constitutionally admissible may lead some courts to admit unreliable
hearsay by erroneously concluding that the defendant has not met the burden of
establishing untrustworthiness. Thus, the presumptive constitutional status of
statements falling within these exceptions makes it more difficult for a defendant
to argue successfully a legitimate claim that his constitutional rights have been
violated.
Furthermore, courts have been overly liberal in construing the firmly
rooted concept to include numerous exceptions, the requirements of which
clearly do not guarantee the trustworthiness of virtually any statement offered
under them. 188 Therefore, even if it were conceded that the guarantees of trust-
worthiness offered by one or two exceptions might warrant their classification as
firmly rooted, this does not justify the existence of the firmly rooted concept in
general. The concept of firmly rooted exceptions results in little, if any, practical
benefit over case-by-case analysis. The constitutionality of each hearsay state-
187. See FED. R. EVID. 301 ("a presumption imposes on the party against whom it is directed
the burden of going forward with evidence to rebut or meet the presumption").
188. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text. When the accused has not been provided
an opportunity to question the witness, courts should refrain from categorizing an exception as
firmly rooted in two situations: (1) when the exception is not founded on the statement's inherent
reliability, but rather on some other legal justification; and (2) when the exception is founded on
irrational assumptions regarding the inherent reliability of the circumstances under which such
statements are made. An irrational assumption can arise when an exception was created long ago as
a result of psychological assumptions that no longer are correct. If the reliability underlying an
exception is fictional or irrational, then its classification as "firmly rooted" would be contrary to both
due process and the reliability rationale that underlies the confrontation clause. Some of the excep-
tions listed in Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 n.8, as well as all of the exceptions discussed in this section of
the Article, fall into one or both of these two categories and do not merit classification as "firmly
rooted."
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ment must still be tested in every case in which the defendant challenges the
statement's reliability.
The prosecution's use of hearsay may or may not violate a defendant's right
to confront witnesses. In the absence of an opportunity to question the declar-
ant, that determination depends on whether the hearsay was spoken in circum-
stances possessing adequate "indicia of reliability." Therefore, a different test is
needed to determine when hearsay exceptions conform to the demands of con-
frontation. The most important feature of such a test would be its flexibility in
allowing the prosecution use of reliable hearsay without impairing the constitu-
tional rights of the accused.
VII. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court has held that unconfronted hearsay must
possess adequate "indicia of reliability" before it can be used against a criminal
defendant. In dicta, the Court in Roberts concluded that sufficient "indicia of
reliability" can be inferred if the hearsay statement falls within the definition of a
firmly rooted exception.1 89 However, the Court has not fully explained which
exceptions are firmly rooted and why.
Based on the standards articulated by the Court, any determination on
which exceptions qualify as firmly rooted must be based on the reliability that is
likely for virtually any statement admissible within that particular exception.
Combining the standards established in both Dutton 190 and Roberts,191 the test
should be formulated as follows: Exceptions to the hearsay rule should be classi-
fied as firmly rooted only if (1) the exception guarantees the accused a meaning-
ful opportunity to question the declarant or (2) the circumstances prerequisite to
admission under that exception realistically assure a substantial likelihood that
virtually any statement offered under it is based on personal knowledge and is
not the product of either faulty recollection, or intentional or unintentional mis-
representation. Exceptions founded on mistaken assumptions of trustworthiness
or not based on inherent guarantees of trustworthiness should not be categorized
as firmly rooted.
The division of exceptions into categories of firmly and nonfirmly rooted, is
an unsatisfactory method of determining the constitutionality of admitting hear-
say against criminal defendants. The likelihood of trustworthiness for each
hearsay statement must be measured by reference to the four factors for testing
reliability set forth in Dutton.192 Measured against these factors, most excep-
tions that have been classified as "firmly rooted," including those listed by the
Supreme Court, inspire little confidence that virtually any statement admissible
under them will possess inherent indicia of reliability. Thus, the "firmly rooted"
concept is neither workable nor useful and should be abandoned.
189. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
190. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
191. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
192. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 88-89.
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Flexibility is required to balance the need for face-to-face confrontation and
the efficient administration of justice. The only workable method of reconciling
exceptions to the hearsay rule with the reliability demands of the confrontation
clause is the one Roberts suggested for hearsay not falling within firmly rooted
exceptions: a case-by-case examination to determine whether the hearsay state-
ment was made under circumstances of particularized guarantees of trustworthi-
ness. The burden of establishing trustworthiness should rest on the prosecution
as the proponent of the evidence.
However, if courts continue to apply the concept of firmly rooted excep-
tions, at a minimum the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of any
statement falling within such an exception should not be conclusive. Rather, the
presumption should be rebutted whenever the accused has been denied an op-
portunity to question the declarant and the out-of-court assertion was not made
under circumstances of "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." To hold
otherwise would impose a rigidity that contravenes the constitutional protec-
tions afforded those who are criminally accused.

